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2ABSTRACT
The issues of increased funding and the reorganization of
the Federal cancer research effort were discussed and debated
in Congress from March, 1970 until December, 1971 when the
National Cancer Act of 1971 was passed by Congress and became
law. A National Panel of Consultants on the Conquest of Cancer
was authorized by the Senate in 1970 and gave its report in
December of that year. Three major bills on cancer research
were presented to Congress in 1971 at different points in the
year. Hearings were held by the House and Senate subcommittees
concerned with health issues.
There was a general concensus that funding for cancer
research should be increased and debate in Congress centered
around the issue of reorganizing the Federal cancer research
effort, then located in the National Cancer Institute within
the National Institutes of Health. One side of the debate was
supported by philanthropist Mary Lasker, the American Cancer
Society, and most cancer researchers; Mary Lasker, leading
officials of the American Cancer Society, and several other
individuals constituted the ACS-Lasker lobbying group which
worked intensively in Congress to see the realization of their
proposals and viewpoint. The ACS-Lasker side of the cancer
research debate wished to see the NCI absorbed into a new can-
cer research agency independent of the NIH and directly respon-
sible to the President. Those on the other side of the debate,
which included most biomedical researchers and physicians in
this country, wished to see the structure of the NIH preserved.
The ideology of cancer research is the viewpoint and
system of interrelated beliefs which were believed and expressed
by almost all persons who supported the ACS-Lasker side of the
debate. .This ideology is referred to as the ACS ideology. It
is composed of four elements: One about the seriousness of
cancer, a second about the high potential for results that now
exist in cancer research (the "breakthrough theory"), a third
about the proper approach or direction that research into the
problems of cancer should take, and a fourth element about how
cancer research should be organized (including the proposal for
an independent cancer research organization).
Many parts of the ACS ideology were accepted by Congress,
and this acceptance was reflected in the provisions of the
National Cancer Act of 1971.
3PREFACE
My own interests in making this study come from dissatis-
faction with the kind of discussion that occurred in Congress
with respect to cancer research. My own experience has been
in connection with comprehensive health planning and the deli-
very of health care; my own bias is towards the improvement of
the delivery of health care as a higher priority than increases
in medical research support. Health care delivery is now a
national issue, and various health insurance schemes are before
Congress. I agree with many, that all Americans should have a
right to high quality health care, which is not only accessible
to all but delivered in a manner respectful of the patient. I
suggest in the thesis that what was needed in the cancer research
debate was the elaboration of a health care ideology to oppose
the cancer research ideology supported by the American Cancer
Society.
I also have.an intellectual dissatisfaction with the emo-
tional nature of the cancer research debate in Congress. It
would have been nice to see a rational weighing of evidence and
arguments covering the range of alternative health priorities,
from cancer research, and other medical research priorities, to
the problems of adequate health care delivery available to all
groups. It is much more realistic to accept the structure and
nature of the political process, and to suggest that what is
4needed is the development of opposing ideologies rather than
hope that political discussion may become analytical and strictly
objective.
The main focus of the thesis is the examination of the
cancer research ideology, referred to as the ACS ideology, and
the determination of the degree to which the ideology was
accepted by Congress and reflected in the final legislation,
passed in December, 1971, on the funding and reorganization of
cancer research.
The first several chapters of the thesis provide background
information necessary for the two chapters of discussion of the
cancer research ideology and its functioning in the legislative
debate. This background information includes a discussion and
working definition of ideology, a presentation of the health
care vs. research priorities argument, and histories of the
National Institutes of Health and the American Cancer Society.
There is also a chapter on the lobbying group which gave initial
impetus to the cancer research debate. The members of this
group were the chief supporters and originators of the cancer
research ideology. Finally there is a chapter outlining the
major events in the cancer research debate in Congress from
March, 1970 to December, 1971.
I want to acknowledge at this point several individuals
who were very helpful in writing the thesis: my adviser,
Professor Rob Hollister, for direction to this topic, and for
continued valuable assistance and advice; Steve Girton, for his
5comments on the first draft of the thesis; and Charles Wordell
for his reading of the first draft.
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7INTRODUCTION
The issue of increased funding and Federal organization
of cancer research was before the Congress from March, 1970
until December, 1971, when a bill was finally passed and signed
into law. The National Cancer Act of 1971 provides chiefly for
increased funding for three years for a National Cancer Program
of research into the causes and treatment of cancer, and for
several organizational changes in the National Institutes of
Health (NIH) and the National Cancer Institute (NCI). Through-
out the period of discu'ssion in Congress about cancer research,
controversy and debate centered around what the proper organiza-
tional arrangement should be for a Federal program of cancer
research. Virtually all members of Congress supported the
authorization of increased funding for cancer research.
The seriousness of the disease (or the group of diseases
classified as cancers) was evident; it is the second ranking
cuase of death in this country. Death from this disease is
often slow, painful, and debilitating. Many Congressmen had
members of their families or friends who had suffered from can-
cer or had had the disease themselves. The issue was an emo-
tional one.
The specific concerns of the thesis are with the ideologi-
cal and emotional influences on the legislature which were arti-
culated by Congressmen and in testimony before Congress.
8Particularly important in regard to these influences are the
statements and thinking of a group centered -round the American
Cancer Society, which had a strong influence in shaping the
debate about the organization of cancer research. ACS thinking
represented one side of the debate. ACS thinking about cancer
research represents a firm viewpoint and a strong committment
to finding new cures and/or treatment for the various cancers,
and that viewpoint can be characterized as an ideology. The
ACS viewpoint has characteristics which make it an ideology,
and the discussion of the rest of the thesis will argue that
it is useful to make the analysis in these terms.
The group connected with the ACS also carried out a con-
certed lobbying effort -in order to present its thinking before
Congress, and the influence of ACS thinking on the legislative
process cannot be considered completely separate from the effect
of the lobbying effort; however, it is clear that the ACS ideology
provided the. program which the lobbying efforts sought to imple-
ment. Various kinds of evidence, which will be presented later,
show that the ACS ideology was influential in the Congressional
debate. The final National Cancer Act in many ways reflected
the thinking of the ACS, although the ACS failed to have some
of its key provisions incorporated in the final bill.
The development of ideology when different groups are pre-
senting competing viewpoints seems inevitable in the political
process. In the cancer research debate there was only one group
opposing the proposals set forth by the lobbying group; this
group was composed of most researchers engaged in biomedical
9research, though not cancer research, and most physicians.
They opposed the ACS proposals to alter the structure of the
NIH and to create a cancer research agency separate from the
NIH.
No one in Congress questioned the basic concensus about
increasing cancer research funding and supported instead a high
priority for the problems of adequate health care delivery. The
forceful presentation of such a health care viewpoint would have
inevitably required the existence of a strong lobbying group
(and/or national organization) and well articulated ideology
to support it. The existence of such a lobbying group would
have brought into the cancer research an issue which was treated
only tangentially in the cancer research debate--the issue of
health care delivery priorities as opposed to research priori-
ties. This discussion about alternate priorities is extended
in the third chapter and will be returned to at the end of the
thesis.
There are some problems in pursuing the study of ideologi-
cal influences in a debate. The information available to me is
chiefly from public documents, hearings before Congressional
committees, and debate on the floor of Congress and very little
about behind-the-scenes maneuvering. A rigorous study of emo-
tional and ideological influences on decision-making would seek
the psychological and socio-psychological determinants of behav-
ior and thinking. An individual's thinking is influenced by
many factors and the mere presence of an ideological argument
does not indicate whether or not it will be accepted.
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A politician's thinking is especially sensitive to the positions
and thinking of others, especially his constituency. The study
of the behavior of Congress can become exceedingly complex and
difficult. The study of the ACS ideology cannot be so strictly
rigorous, but it will be shown that many parts of the ACS ide-
ology were apparently accepted by the Congress, and that the
ideology was forcefully presented to the Congress through ACS
lobbying efforts.
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DISCUSSION AND DEFINITION OF IDEOLOGY
This section discusses some of the issues and problems
inherent in the analysis of ideology; and indicate some of the
past theorizing about ideology and the sociology of knowledge.
Analysts of ideology have in the past usually dealt with poli-
tical ideologies, which are extremely broad in scope. These
ideologies, such as the different branches of Communism, pro-
vide a comprehensive world v.iew, comprehensive in terms of
what should be the proper structure of society, the proper
distribution of power in society, what the role of different
social groups should be, and what activities give meaning to
the existence of individuals. Many discussions of ideology
have in fact been made in a specific Cold War context.
For the purposes of this analysis, a different concept of
ideology is used: the scope of an ideology does not have to
embrace the whole-of society and the meaning of man's exis-
tence, but may be restricted in scope. Some writers have con-
sidered ideology in a limited sense. Karl Mannheim's 1936 book,
Ideology and Utopia, is considered the basis of the modern field
of the sociology of knowledge and of current discussions of
ideology. Mannheim refers to the concept of a "particular"
ideology, which has been described as "beliefs which express
the interests of a particular social group.". The "interests"
12
referred to are any kind of interests: economic, altruistic,
religious, moral, group enhancement, etc. "Interests" has
also been considered equivalent to the aims or purposes of a
social group.2 Thus Nigel Harris in Beliefs in Society states
that "we shall, here, try to locate 'ideology' as the language
of the purposes of a social group."3
Harris in the same book presents the concept of the
"embryonic ideology:"
one can see the beginnings of ideology wherever any
social group faces over a more or less extended per-
iod of time a common problem, purpose or the need
for common action. The definition of a group, its
creation, has already been discussed and part and
parcel of its awareness of itself as a &roup is the
formulation of some embryonic ideology.
Harris is also providing specific comment on the dynamics of
the formation of ideology, i.e. that it is in response to the
need for joint action.
Harris also notes that the formation of an embryonic
ideology in a group occurs in response to conflict with other
groups which compels the group "to define itself and sustain
that definition." 5 "Wherever interests are vigorously pur-
suded, an ideology tends to be developed also to give meaning,
reinforcement and justification to these interests."6 Harris,
in addition, states that "ideologies relate to the arena of
social conflict, to the purposes of groups competing for
scarce resources. 7
The discussion here about the relation of purposes and
interests of a social group to its ideology is similar to
Mannheim's so-called "interest assumption" which "holds that
13
ideas and forms of thought are Tin accord with,' that is,
gratifying to, the interests of the subjects."8 Ideology,
then, arises when social groups are in conflict, and it
expresses and justifies the purposes or aims of a social group.
There is a major problem in the discussion of the ideol-
ogies of specific social groups, for the use of the word,
"ideology," implies that there is some discrepancy between the
"ideological" viewpoint and what is considered "objective"
reality; and the decision as to what is objective reality is
made by the person who is judging whether or not the viewpoint
of a certain group is ideological or not and that person's view-
point is itself subjective and possibly ideological. Harris
states that problem as follows: "we thus must postulate some-
thing referred to hitherto as 'reality,' but in doing so, we
must also admit in all honesty that this other viewpoint is
itself only one among many. It is not 'reality' at all, but
our reality, contrasted to their reality which . . . we are
calling an 'ideology."'" Any discussion of ideology must
assume a certain degree of relativity among the viewpoints of
different groups toward what is true. I have my own viewpoint,
if not ideology, with respect to the issues of biomedical and
cancer research, which is stated in the preface. The purpose
of the thesis is not to discredit the ACS ideology, but partly
to indicate that there are other well-argued viewpoints which
exist. These viewpoints include those of most biomedical
researchers towards the reorganization of cancer research,
which was hostile to the ACS ideology, and my own viewpoint.
14
The chief questions .of the thesis do not concern the validity
of the ACS ideology, but the manner in which this ideology
was used and what influence it had in the Congressional dis-
cussion of the organization of cancer research.
In order to carry out an analysis of the ACS ideology,
and to indicate that the viewpoint articulated by the group
cited above is an ideology, it is necessary to indicate pre-
cisely what "ideology" is defined as, and what the charac-
teristics of an "ideology" are. A definition is presented in
four parts below:
1. Persons articulating the ideology believe statements
expressing or related to the ideology to be true, regardless
of whether or not there exist objective data and reasoned
arguments which provide some uncertainty over the truth of
these statements.
2. The intensity of the belief with respect to state-
ments or elements of the ideology is strong.
3. The elements or statements of the ideology are
mutually supporting, i.e. the statements are coherent with
respect to other statements and elements of the ideology.
4. The ideology provides an encompassing and comprehen-
sive viewpoint with respect to the area of interest with which
the ideology is concerned. (The ideology with respect to can-
cer research, the ACS ideology, is restricted in scope to a
specific area of interest: medicine and biomedical research.
15
The ACS ideology defines cancer as the presently most horri-
fying and serious disease facing mankind and believes that
the first priority of biomedical research should be research
into the treatment and causes of cancer.)
16
PRIORITIES OF RESEARCH AND HEALTH CARE DELIVERY
The purpose of this section is to elaborate on several
arguments about health care delivery and biomedical research
which provide a perspective on the discussions on cancer
research in Congress. One of these arguments is that the
first health priority in this country should be the delivery
of good health care to all Americans', as opposed to the expan-
sion of support for biomedical research. Several writers have
outlined this argument and have called for new Federal financing
and interventions in the field of health care.1* The whole
issue of national health insurance has been before Congress
with several alternative health insurance plans being discussed,
and long hearings have been held on the subject.
The issue of health care delivery was not completely ignored
in the cancer research debate. In the hearings before the Senate
Subcommittee on Health, Senator Humphrey states a concern for the
improved delivery of health care, and sees such improved health
care as a means to decreasing cancer mortality due to earlier
diagnosis and preventive measures.1" Other Congressmen express
a concern for making more available the best presently known
means of early diagnosis for cancers; scientists and Congressmen
repeatedly note that the application of the present knowledge
about prevention and early diagnosis of cancers would definitely
lower the cancer mortality rate. The National Cancer Act of 1971
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provides for funding for cancer control programs in cooperation
with state and other health agencies for the "diagnosis, pre-
vention, and treatment of cancer." 1 2
The Congress, while aware of the need for- better health
care delivery and in fact acting on providing support for
specific cancer control programs, still saw the value in pur-
suing more highly funded medical research directed against can-
cer. The National Urban Coalition Counterbudget presents an
alternative view: "Federal leadership must concern itself with
'governing' the health-care system: building on the marvelous
technology and skill that now exist a system to improve the
health care of all." 1 3
An article by Professor T. H. Weller of the Harvard School
of Public Health "Medical Research 'Measured Against the Needs
of All'" provides an analysis of the research vs. delivery of
health care issue on a worldwide scale. He describes the need
for basic clinical and therapeutic services in the developing
countries. He ranks research into population control as a
first priority, and further research into infectious and para-
sitic diseases as a second priority. In his article Weller
presents the following quote: "The grim irony is that dazzling
advances in biomedical sciences are scarcely felt in areas
where need is greatest. Vast numbers of people are dying of
preventable and curable diseases, or surviving with physical
and intellectual impairment for lack of even the simplest meas-
ures of modern medicine."
18
Weller's argument is compelling; but it seems politically
unrealistic to expect the Congress or Americans to place the
health care problems of the rest of the world ahead or even
alongside of America's own inadequacies in health care delivery,
or to give research in areas relevant to problems of developing
countries the priority which is given to the present major areas
of medical research.
Other arguments in support of alternate domestic medical
research priorities have been made. One of these alternative
priorities is research into the treatment of trauma, which is
now inadequate in comparison to research allocations for other
diseases and medical problems. 1 5 Another is sickle-cell anemia,
which afflicts only Blacks, whereas other "childhood diseases,"
which afflict White children as well as Black are well funded
both through Federal research support and voluntary contribu-
tions. 16 By now of course funding and research for sickle-cell
anemia has been provided through the Federal government; in
this case priorities did change in response to a popular move-
ment.
It will be useful to look at some comments on and criti-
cisms of biomedical research in the United States, especially
in light of the cancer research debate and the Congressional
concensus with respect to cancer to be discussed later. "Limited
peripheral vision is apparent in many biomedical research workers.
The research specialist, blind to the panorama of human needs,
may-exaggerate the potential impact of any subject area of
biomedical science, justifying his claims with complete sincerity,
19
righteous emotion, and carefully marshalled evidence." 17 The
optimism of many biomedical researchers has led to the develop-
ment of a research gap which exists in the United States between
claims for success made for biomedical research and the much
more modest actual results.'8 The cancer debate in Congress
maintains this approach to research funding for cancer; persons
following ACS thinking argue at length that cancer research is
now at a "breakthrough" stage and increased research support
will lead to dramatic advances in the cure and treatment of
cancer.
20
HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH
AND THE NATIONAL CANCER INSTITUTE
The debate about the reorganization of cancer research
before Congress was primarily about whether to separate the
National Cancer Institute (NCI) from the National Institutes
of Health (NIH), or to give the NCI greater independence,
though officially still to be located in the NIH. This sec-
tion presents a brief history and discussion of the structure
of the NIH. The National Institute of Health was'created in
1930, when the Federal government's Hygienic Laboratory was
renamed the National Institute of Health. The National
Cancer Institute was authorized by Congress in 1937 by a
bill cosponsored by every member of Congress. In 1948 the
National Institutes of Health was established with the
creation of four new institutes, including the National
Heart Institute. Eventually six additional institutes and
two divisions, a Division of Biological Standards and a
Division of Research Resources, were established. The
largest institute, even before the additional appropriations
for fiscal 1971 for cancer research, was the National Cancer
Institute, with appropriations of 230 million dollars for
1971; the second largest institute was the National Heart
and Lung Institute, with appropriations of 193 million
dollars. Appropriations for the whole NIH was about 1.2 bil-
lion dollars.
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The NCI carries on two major kinds of research activi-
ties: 1. programs at its own laboratories located at the
NIH in Bethesda, Maryland and direct research contracts, and
2. .extramural grants for research and training to institu-
tions throughout the country. The NCI has four major depart-
ments: Etiology, Chemotherapy, General Labs and Clinics, and
Research and Training Grants (Extramural). Etiology refers
to the cause or origins of disease, and the Etiology Depart-
ment conducts research, both through contract arrangements
and "inhouse" laboratories, into the causes and prevention
of cancer, such as the identification of cancer-causing sub-
stances (carcinogens).
The Chemotherapy Department conducts a screening program
in search of drugs effective in the treatment of cancer. The
program--initiated in 1955--has tested several hundred thou-
sand drugs, found 24 drugs with some effectiveness against
cancer, found drugs which will cure two forms of cancer, and
cost about 250 million dollars.19
The Chemotherapy and Etiology Departments both conduct
research in a programmed and highly directed manner in pur-
suit of specific kinds of discoveries. The other departments
of the NCI are much less organized and give support to vari-
ous areas of biomedical research which are related to the
problem of cancer. The distinction is important for it is
this question, of how to pursue cancer research, through
either a primarily programmed or more eclectic approach,
22
which split the Congress and scientific and biomedical research
experts.
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HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY
The purpose of the American Cancer Society (ACS), in the
words of Dr. Pollard, current president of the organization,
is "to do everything possible, as a private, national, volun-
tary organization, to hasten the elimination of cancer as a
threat to human life and well-being." 2 0  The ACS began as the
American Society for the Control of Cancer (ASCC); which was
founded in 1913 by members of the American College of Surgeons,
and the two organizations shared leadership until 1931. The
major activities of the ASCC were originally the collection of
statistics on cancer mortality and the care by volunteers of
patients suffering from cancer. The ASCC also promoted and
sponsored public education programs about cancer and the impor-
tance of, early detection and diagnosis of cancer, an activity
which the American Cancer Society continues as a major part of
its program.
In 1945 the ASCC was reorganized and renamed the American
Cancer Society, and in 1948 the ACS gave out its first grants
to institutions in support of cancer research. The ACS is sup-
ported by voluntary contributions solicited in annual campaigns,
from which the ACS was able to support approximately 25 million
dollars worth of cancer research on its own (in 1971), in grants
to 135 different institutions.
24
The ACS charters state divisions as member organizations
of the ACS in all fifty states and has 3100 local "units" on
the county or city level. Membership now stands at two million.
In addition to research and public education about cancer the
ACS conducts programs in professional education for physicians
to acquaint them with the most recent knowledge about the
treatment of cancer. 2 1
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AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY LOBBYING EFFORTS
AND MRS. MARY LASKER
ACS lobbying efforts were very important, in 1970 parti-
cularly, in enabling the ACS position and ACS ideology to be
presented to Congress and in gaining legitimacy, respectabil-
ity, and support for that ideology at an early stage of the
cancer debate. (The "ACS ideology" can be described as a
system of beliefs and a viewpoint which was adopted by persons
associated with this lobbying group--several of whom are offi-
cial representatives of the American Cancer Society--by most
cancer researchers, and by most administrators of cancer hos-
pitals and institutes. The ideology was supported by the ACS
as shown by the official positions of that organization, which
were expressed before Congress in the various hearings on
cancer research which occurred in 1971.)
An understanding of the lobbying efforts requires some
knowledge about Mrs. Mary Lasker, the honorary chairman of the
ACS, a wealthy Radcliffe graduate, and an indefatigable pro-
moter of the cause of biomedical research, and in particular
cancer research. She is described as "a woman of wealth,
charm, social position, and who has extensive contacts in the
scientific world." 2 2 Her experience in the promotion of bio-
medical research extends back to the 1940's, when she and
Albert Lasker, an advertising millionaire, whom she married in
26
1940, persuaded Senator Claude Pepper to hold hearings in 1944
on biomedical research, which the Laskers helped to organize.
These hearings and further efforts by the Laskers and
Mrs..Lasker alone (after her husband died of cancer in 1952)
are credited with being very influential in building up the
funding of the NIH. Claude Pepper has stated that the hearings
were directly responsible for increasing the funding of the NCI
from about 500,000 dollars annual appropriations in 1944, to
18 million dollars by 1948.23
Interest by the Lasker family in cancer research and pre-
vious connections with the ACS date back to 1924, when a 75,000
dollar endowment fund was established as a memorial fund of the
ASCC for Harry Lasker. The Lasker family made additional large
contributions to the ASCC between 1924 and 1940, and Mary Lasker
was connected with the ASCC as early as.1943, when she sought
contributions and support for cancer research endowments for
the ASCC in that year.
Besides being associated with and working with the ACS,
Mary Lasker has contacts with a large number of Congressmen,
scientists, and other persons who are sympathetic to or in
support of the cause of biomedical research. Among these were
Senator Claude Pepper (now a U.S. Representative from Florida),
Senator Lister Hill, President L. B. Johnson, and Dr. James
Shannon (Director of the NIH for twelve years); friends and
contacts she had during the 1970-71 cancer research debate
were Senator Ralph Yarborough (Chairman of the Senate Health
Subcommittee in 1970), Representative John J. Rooney (from
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New York), Senator Ted Kennedy (Chairman of the Senate Health
Subcommittee in 1971), and Dr. Sidney Farber (Director of Can-
cer Research at Children's Cancer Research Foundation). This
specific group, lobbying for cancer research in 1970 and 1971,
will be referred to as the "ACS-Lasker" group. At least one
writer indicates that campaign contributions were a factor in
the Laskers' and Mary Lasker's efforts.2s
The ACS-Lasker group provided the original impetus for a
strengthened effort of cancer research through their efforts
with Senator Yarborough and other Congressmen which led to
the establishment of the National Panel of Consultants on the
Conquest of Cancer. The National Panel was authorized by a
Senate resolution introduced by Senator Yarborough, and
because of the kind of persons appointed to the Panel the
recommendations of the Panel were essentially an expression
of the ACS ideology.
The modus operandi of the Lasker lobbying group has been
described with respect to earlier lobbying efforts in behalf
of both-cancer and biomedical research in the 1950's and 1960's.
It is interesting to look at their "standard operating proce-
dure" because of the similarities between the past lobbying
efforts and the way in which the cancer research issue was
presented before Congress. Their operating procedure was to
have produced an authoritative report by an official commission.
This procedure was described as follows by Mike Gorman, an
associate and lobbyist in Congress for Mrs. Lasker:
28
Through this kind of study (the White Paper or Com-
mission report) you develop the facts, you involve
a great number of organizations previously not inter-
ested, and you hopefully create a militant concensus
in support of the findings of the Commission. The
White Paper, or Commission report, is the foundation
stone for legislation, and it provides an obvious
answer to the familiar myriad of charges raised by
hostile legislators--you didn't study the problem
long enough, your conclusions were hastily drawn,
you didn't consult a broad enough segment of pro-
fessional groups or of the American people at large,
and so on. 26
The Lasker group is credited with two previous efforts in
the 1960's on behalf of cancer research (and other biomedical
research): first, a 1961 Presidential Commission .on Heart
Disease and Cancer--which produced a poorly done report which
led to no legislation; and second, the 1964 Presidential
Commission on Heart Disease, Cancer, and Stroke. The second
commission led to the legislation for the Regional Medical
Program (RMP), though that program did not actually implement
all of the Commission's recommendations with respect to cancer
research, and more of the money went for programs connected
with heart disease than for cancer. Specifically, the RMP
program provided for the establishment of a series of national
centers to provide for research, training, and patient care in
cancer, stroke, and heart disease, although the program has
been underfunded and more general in the kinds of activities
that it actually supports.27
The 1964 Commission's specific recommendations on cancer
research were similar to the recommendations of the National
Panel in 1970. The Commission made a detailed study of the
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then current state of the art in cancer research, identified
areas of cancer research that deserved increased financial
support, and recommended increased overall support for cancer
research, rising from 365 million dollars annual appropria-
tions in the first year of increased support to 739 million
dollars in the fifth year. The National Panel report made
the same kind of study and recommendations as the Commission
with respect to these three points, except that the Panel's
recommendations for increased cancer research funding were
somewhat higher. The Panel in addition made extensive recom-
mendations on the reorganization of cancer research.28
Mary Lasker is supposed to have decided sometime in 1968
or 1969 that it was time for a new effort to push cancer
research in Congress. She was able with the help of
Col. Luke E. Quinn, the ACS lobbyist, to get Senator Ralph
Yarborough (who was then chairman of the Senate Subcommittee
on Health) to introduce a resolution to the Senate (Senate
Resolution 376) calling for the appointment of the National
Panel. The resolution passed the Senate, and 250,000 dollars
was provided for the Panel. Its members were appointed by
Senator Yarborough in consultation with Col. Quinn, and its
members were mostly past or present members of the ACS Board
of Directors. The National Panel produced a report (described
above) in December of 1970 which, in addition to what has been
said already, called for the creation of a separate National
Cancer Authority, which would be an independent agency of the
government reporting directly to the President and structured
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in a way similar to the National Aeronautics and Space Admin-
istration and the Atomic Energy Commission. 2"
The Panel report is an expression of the ACS ideology.
The similarity to the White Paper device described earlier
is that the Panel report was an official document authorized
by the Senate, which was a detailed study of the cancer
research issue and which included in its membership of 26
(one-half scientists and one-half distinguished laymen) a
group broadly representative of industry, labor, and charitable
organizations. The scientific members of the National Panel
were, however, not representative of the range of interests in
biomedical research but were strongly dominated by scientists
who were engaged in cancer research or who were administrators
of cancer research hospitals or institutes. If the scientists
on the National Panel included a broad representation of
researchers not specifically connected with biomedical research
(as the "Whi.te Paper" approach would have required) the Panel
surely would not have been so radical in its recommendations
for organizational changes nor so clearly expressed the ACS
ideology. Most biomedical researchers who are not specifically
connected with cancer research were opposed to any changes in
the structure of the National Institutes of Health and the
approach to biomedical research which the NIH pursued; the-
Panel recommendations would have taken the National Cancer
Institute out of the NIH and subsumed the NCI within the National
Cancer Authority (NCA).
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The recommendations of the National Panel were in line
with the wording of Senate Resolution 376 and the mandate that
the Panel was given. Senator Yarborough, in introducing
Senate Resolution 376 declares that the tasks of the Panel
were to examine the then current level of funding for cancer
research, and to see what must be done in order to find a can-
cer cure by 1976.30 Thetext of the resolution declares that
the Panel should study the present state of the art in cancer
research, determine the likelihood of finding a cure or cures
for the different cancers, and what will be necessary (in
terms of funding and organization) to speed advances in cancer
research.3' Senator Yarborough in statements before Congress
on December 4, 1970, ddclares that the members of the National
Panel had a common belief that the problem of cancer could be
eliminated if an intense enough research effort were made. 3"
Another lobbying effort undertaken by the Lasker group is
the exertion of influence on President Nixon to gain his sup-
port for the National Panel recommendations. Representative
Satterfield in the hearings on the cancer research issue states
that Elmer Holmes Bobst, a member of the National Panel and
Chairman of the Board, Warner Lambert Pharmaceutical Co., was
"quite instrumental" in influencing the President to issue
statements in support of an independent cancer agency and an
increased cancer research effort.3 3 In his State of the Union
message in January, 1971, the President affirms that there
should be "a campaign to find a cure for cancer," that he will
request an additional 100 million dollars for cancer research
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for Fiscal Year 1972 (which was granted by Congress), and
asserted that the "time has come in America when the same kind
of concentrated effort that split the atom and took men to the
moon should be turned toward conquering this dread disease." 3 4
Again in the President's National Health Message to Congress in
February of 1971: "The time has now come to put more of our
resources into cancer research and--learning an important lesson
from our space program--to organize those resources as effec-
tively as possible." 3 5 While President Nixo-n did not explicitly
support the concept of an independent cancer agency and later in
1971 did not support the legislative bills calling for drastic
reorganization of cancer research, his statements indicate
support for some kind of reorganization of cacer research, and
he does draw the same analogy as the National Panel did between
a new reorganized cancer effort and the moonshot and atomic
energy programs.
There are two other events which apparently represent
lobbying efforts of the Lasker group, though various - observers
of the Congressional debate on cancer researdi do not explicitly
connect the Lasker group with these events. One is the intro-
duction of House Concurrent Resolution 675 before the House of
Representatives by Representative John Rooney in the first half
of 1970. This resolution called for an incrased cancer
research effort and for the conquest of cancer by 1976, as "an
appropriate commemoration of the 200th anniversary of our
country." 36  The resolution was passed by both houses by Septem-
ber 30, 1970. John Rooney's subsequent testimony before the
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House Subcommittee on Public Health and Environment indicates
that he supports the ACS ideology on cancer research.3 7 (He
had a successful operation for lung cancer in 1966.)
Another event which was probably a Lasker lobbying effort
was a Senate luncheon on February 11, 1971 hosted by Senators
Mansfield and Scott and attended by thirteen members of the
National Panel. Five of the scientific members of the Panel
spoke to the group and reiterated the arguments and position
put forth in the National Panel report. Those who spoke
included Dr. Sidney Farber, who has been connected with the
ACS-Lasker lobbying group, and Dr. Rhoads, immediate past
president of the ACS.38
Another ACS-Lasker effort to influence Congress was an
advertising campaign in early October of 1971 in support of
S 1828. Full page ads sponsored by the American Cancer Society
appeared in the New York Times, the Washington Post, and the
Washington Evening Star. In addition full page ads were placed
in 21 newspapers in the Congressional districts of the ten mem-
bers of the House Subcommittee on Public Health and the Environ-
ment. The Subcommittee was then considering S 1828, a bill
passed by the Senate which contained many of the recommendations
of the National Panel, and HR 10681, another bill originated by
Subcommittee members which was less extreme in its provisions
for the reorganization of the NCI, the NIH, and cancer research.
The ads placed in the 21 newspapers in the Representatives' dis-
tricts were sponsored by -the Citizens' Committee fo.r the Con-
quest of Cancer, an organization to which Mary Lasker belongs.
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These ads listed three specific individuals as sponsors:
Dr. Farber, an associate of Mary Lasker and co-chairman of
the National Panel; Emerson Foote, a New York advertising
executive and member of the National Panel; and Howard
Metzenbaum, an.Ohio businessman. The ACS ads were not paid
for from ACS funds, but were paid for by "a group of concerned
individuals."39
This effort to influence Congress failed; the Subcommittee
continued to support HR 10681 as opposed to S 1828, and the
bill which later passed the House of Representatives was iden-
tical to HR 10681. This ACS-Lasker effort may even have back-
fired, for it aroused an angry rebuttal in the Senate from the
one Senator (Gaylord N&lson) who had voted against S 1828; and
the House-Senate conference committee, which met to reconcile
the Senate passed bill, S 1828, and the House bill, produced a
conference bill which adopted most of the provisions of the
House bill.' The conference bill was passed by both Houses of
Congress and was signed into law by the President.
By the spring of 1971 the various lobbying efforts of the
ACS and other events described above had placed before the
Senate an official, well-reasoned, and scientifically detailed
report on cancer research which expressed the position of and
ideology of the ACS-Lasker group. Presidential sanction for
some of the concepts of the ACS ideology had been obtained, and
the ACS position had been presented to the Senate at the Febru-
ary 11 luncheon. The House of Representatives had been
35
introduced to the idea of a new cancer research effort, and
had indicated its support for that idea.
These comments are not meant to imply that these efforts
represent the total lobbying effort of Mrs. Lasker and the ACS,
and they give little indication of the probably extensive
behind-the-scenes efforts of the ACS-Lasker group, but they do
show how the issue of cancer research was presented to the
Congress and the early sympathy of the Congress with the idea
of a new cancer research effort or cancer crusade.
The viewpoint of the ACS-Lasker group corresponds to the
ACS ideology, and there is an additional aspect of the view-
point of Mary Lasker and her associates which is implicit in
the ACS ideology as will be indicated later and is expressed
explicitly at points in the House hearings. Many in the Lasker
group, including Mary Lasker herself, felt that the results of
biomedical research (for cancer and other diseases)were not
applied as quickly as they should have been to the treatment of
cancer patients; this feeling was behind the push for the
Regional Medical Program; and it is a criticism of the NIH.
The NIH is alleged to lack "a sense of mission to reduce the
death rate directly" and a "sense of urgency" in the words of
Mary Lasker. 4 This suspicion of the NIH underlies the concern of
the ACS ideology with the reorganization of cancer research,
and the specific National Panel recommendation for a National
Cancer Authority independent of the NIH. The next section
which discusses the ACS ideology will specify ACS-Lasker think-
ing about the reorganization of cancer research more clearly.
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The paragraphs above have shown what the "ACS-Lasker
lobbying group" is and how it functions. This group should
not be viewed as a monolithic, all-powerful, and always success-
ful group, but as one which does manage to get issues placed
before Congress and to wield some influence in support of them
through Congressmen sympathetic to the various issues and causes.
Mary Lasker should not be viewed as the dominating ringleader of
the group but as the most influential and energetic person in
a group of Congressmen, scientific experts, and officials and
representatives of certain organizations (in this case the
American Cancer Society) who are interested in the cause of bio-
medical research (and particularly in 1970 and 1971, cancer
research). There are many connections between Mary Lasker and
the ACS, and the lobbying group we have been referring to could
be called accurately the ACS lobbying group (at least with res-
pect to the cancer research debate in Congress), though Mary
Lasker provides the thread of continuity in a lobbying group
which has been active since 1944.
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OUTLINE OF THE CANCER RESEARCH
ORGANIZATION DEBATE
The discussion in Congress about the organization of can-
cer research which led to the passing of the National Cancer
Act of 1971 began in March, 1970 and lasted until the end of
1971. Some of the details of the various bills proposed and
the issues which were debated have been indicated in the pre-
vious sections. This section will provide a summary of events
discussed already and a description of the other events during
1970 and 1971.
Two resolutions were passed by Congress in support of
increased funding for cancer research in 1970, one of which
authorized a study on cancer research by a national panel of
scientists and laymen. Three major bills were presented to
Congress on the reorganization of the Federal cancer research
effort: S 34 embodied the recommendations of the national
panel report, and was sponsored by Senators Kennedy and Javits.
The first bill numbered "S 1828" was a bill supported by the
Administration. The second version of S 1828, which was passed
by the Senate in the summer of 1971, was very similar to S 34.
HR 11302 was first introduced in the House of Representatives
and was sponsored by Democrats on the House Subcommittee on
Public Health and the Environment. HR 11302 was passed by the
House in the fall of 1971. The final bill cited as S 1828 was
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the bill produced by the conference committep which reconciled
the differences between the second version of S 1828 and
HR 11302. The third S 1828 was very similar to HR 11302 and
was the bill to be signed into law.
A. National Panel of Consultants
on the Conquest of Cancer
Senate Resolution 376, calling for the establishment of a
National Panel of Consultants on the Conquest of Cancer, was
introduced before the Senate on March 25, 1970. The resolu-
tion had 53 cosponsors and was passed by the Senate on April 27,
1970 by a unanimous vote. The resolution declared that the
conquest of cancer should be made a national priority, and that
the Panel should:
examine, investigate, and make a complete study of
any and all matters pertaining to (1) the present
status and extent of scientific research conducted
by governmental and nongovernmental agencies to
ascertain the causes and develop means for the
treatment, cure, and elimination of cancer, (2) the
prospect for success in such endeavors, and (3) means
and measures necessary or desirable to facilitate
success in such endeavors at the earliest possible
time.1
Two-hundred. and fifty thousand dollars was appropriated by the
Senate for the National Panel.
The National Panel was composed of thirteen scientists and
thirteen distinguished laymen, and the members were selected by
Senator Yarborough on behalf of the Senate Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare (the Subcommittee on Health, of which
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Yarborough was chairman, is a subcommittee of this committee). 4 2
The chairman of the Panel was Benno C. Schmidt, Managing Partner
of J. H. Whitney and Company, New York, and the co-chairman was
Dr. Sidney Farber, Scientific Director of Children's Cancer
Research Foundation, Boston. The National Panel met for a total
of ten full days, subcommittees met for additional days, and
testimony was received from 289 witnesses.
The National Panel presented its report to the Senate
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on November 25, 1970. The
report indicated various areas of cancer research that were
"areas of promise" for the discovery of new effective treatment
or, cures for various cancers or all cancers. The report also
contained specific recommendations for the reorganization of
cancer research; a national program for the conquest of cancer
should be established which would have the following character-
istics which the then present cancer research programs did not:
"effective administration with clearly defined authority and
responsibility," "a comprehensive national plan for a coherent
and systematic attack on the vastly complex problems of cancer,"
and "the necessary financial resources."4 3 Tie report specifi-
cally recommended that a National Cancer Authrity, which would
absorb the National Cancer Institute, should 3e established.
The NCA would be an independent agency direct.By responsible to
the President, and the President would appoint the director of
the Authority with the approval of the Senate.. The report
recommended the establishment of new cancer centers throughout
the country, which would engage in training and research
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(including clinical research) into the problems of cancer,
and the strengthening of presently existing cancer centers.
The report also recommended the establishment of a National
Cancer Advisory Board.
B. House Concurrent Resolution 675
This resolution was introduced before the House of Repre-
sentatives in early 1970 by Congressman John Rooney of New York,
and passed by both Houses of Congress by September 30, 1970.
The resolution expressed the sense of the Comgjress that "the
Conquest of Cancer is a national crusade" and that "the Congress
should appropriate the necessary funds so thalt the citizens of
this land and all other lands may be delivereil from the greatest
medical scourge in history." 4
C. Senator Yarborough's Cancer Researdi Bill
On December 4, 1970, Senator Yarborough lntroduced a bill
before the Senate, S. 4564, which contained the recommendations
of the National Panel. Yarborough, however, had been defeated
for re-election.
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D. President Nixon's State of the Union Address,
January 22, 1971
In this address, the President stated his support for a
new cancer research effort, requested an additional 100 million
dollars funding for cancer research for fiscal 1972 and gave
support to the National Panel recommendations on the reorganiza-
tion of cancer research. The additional funding for cancer
research was authorized by Congress in the second supplemental
appropriations bill of 1971 passed by Congress on May 24, 1971.
E. President Nixon's National Health Message
to Congress, February 18, 1971
In his Health Message, the President reaffirmed his support
for a new cancer research effort, and announced that he was
establishing a new Cancer Conquest Program in the National
Institutes of Health. He again affirmed the need for a reorgan-
ization -of cancer research, somewhat along the lines recommended
by the National Panel, but cautioned against too high expecta-
tions of rapid advances in the treatment of cancer: "scientific
breakthroughs are still required and they often cannot be
forced.''4 5 This position contrasts with the more optimistic
position of the National Panel (and the ACS ideology) on the
likelihood of new discoveries in cancer research.
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F. President's Statement at the Introduction
of the Administration's Cancer Research Bill,
S 1828, before the Senate, May 11, 1971
The President again affirmed his support for a new and
more intense cancer research effort, and describes the bill that
the Administration is presenting to the Senate. He also stated
that new organizational skills must be applied to the cancer
research effort, and as he did in his two earlier statements
about cancer research, he referred to the "efficient management"
of the space program, and the need-to apply management techniques
used in the space program to cancer research." His bill,
S 1828, called for the-establishment of a Cancer Cure Program
within the NIH, though the director of that program would be
appointed by the President, and the Program would submit its
budget directly to the President (rather than through the NIH
and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare). Nixon
repeated his earlier cautionary comments about too high expecta-
tions for rapid discoveries and breakthroughs in the field of
cancer research.
The administration's position is one which affirmed the need
for a national crusade against cancer, and agreed with the
National Panel's call for a new organizational approach to can-
cer research, but did not support the specific National Panel
recommendations about cancer research organization and the need
for an independent National Cancer Authority. One source states
that the Administration at first was opposed to any kind of new
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legislation for the organization of cancer research, though not
to increased funding for cancer research. Nixon did indicate
that he was going to go ahead and establish a Cancer Conquest
Program within the NIH in his National Health Message. The
Administration then decided to offer its own bill on cancer
research, probably in light of the great amount of support
which S 34 was receiving. S 34 was a bill sponsored by
Senators Kennedy and Javits (with a total of 52 cosponsors in
March of 1970) which expressed the recommendations of the National
Panel for an independent National Cancer Authority.
G. Hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Health,
and Senate Debate and Vote
on the Second Version of S 1828
Hearings on S 34 were held by the Subcommittee on Health
of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on March 9
and 10, 1971. The chairman of that subcommittee is Edward
Kennedy. After S 1828 was introduced to the Senate by Senator
Dominick in May, hearings were held on both bills on June 10,
1971. A bill which was a compromise between S 34 and S 1828 was
reported out of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on
June 29, 1971. The nature of the "compromise," the second bill
numbered "'S 1828? was as follows: The bill would establish a
"Conquest of Cancer Agency as an independent agency within the
National Institutes of Health," and otherwise mostly contained
provisions and wording taken from S 34.- The Administration
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did not really support the idea of an independent cancer agency
but had wanted the bill to be reported out oS the Senate com-
mittee quickly and wished it to be titled "S 1828" rather than
after the bill sponsored by Kennedy and Javits.' Also, Nixon
was supposed to be most interested in having the director of
the cancer agency or program report directly to the President
and be appointed by the President (rather than primarily inter-
ested in preserving the structure of the NIH).50 The Conquest
of Cancer Agency described by the new S 1828 is in fact very
much an independent agency: the National Cancer Institute would
be absorbed by the CCA, and the director of the CCA would report
directly to the President, present the budget for the CCA
directly to the President, and would be appointed by the Presi-
dent with the consent of.the Senate. The new S 1828 contained
many of the recommendations of the National Panel, and was con-
sidered an implementation of those recommendations. "
Debate ,on the new S 1828 bill (which eventually had 67
cosponsors) was passed by a vote of 79 to 1 on the same day.
The dissenting vote was cast by Senator Nelson of Wisconsin,
who was opposed to the concept of an independent agency for can-
cer research and favored the establishment of the NIH as an
agency independent of the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare and directly responsible to the President. Needless to
say the Senate debate was in support of S 1828, except for the
comments of Gaylord Nelson.
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H. Hearings before the House Subcommittee
on Public Health and the Environm-nt,
and House Debate and Vote on HR 11302
Hearings before the House Subcommittee on Public Health and
the Environment of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce were held on eleven days between September 15 and
October 11, 1971. The two main bills which were considered in
the hearings were S 1828, and HR 10681, which was a bill spon-
sored by Representative Paul Rogers of Florida, who was chairman
of the subcommittee, and cosponsored by five members (out of a
total of nine other members) of the subcommittee. HR 10681 was
a bill which would be less disruptive to the structure of the
NIH than S 1828. HR 10681 would establish a National Cancer
Attack Program within the NIH; the director of the NCI would
also be the director of the cancer program and would be appointed
by the President; the director would report and present his bud-
get request for the NCI directly to the President. HR 10681
contained several provisions which S 1828 did not have, as fol-
lows: HR 10681 would provide specific appropriations for the
next three years for the NCI: $400 million for fiscal 1972,
$500 million for fiscal 1973, and $600 million for fiscal 1974.
In addition, HR 10681 would specifically authorize $90 million
over three years for cancer control programs for the "preven-
tion, control, and eradication of cancer."5 2 The President
would appoint without consulting the Senate the director of the
NIH, the directors of the National Heart and Lung Institute and
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the National Institute of Neurological Diseases and Stroke as
well as the NCI. At that time none of the jirectors of any of
the national institutes or even the director of the NIH was
appointed by the President. HR 11302 also provided for the
establishment of fifteen additional cancer centers for "clini-
cal research, training, and demonstration of advanced diagnos-
tic and treatment methods relating to cancer. 5 3
The House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
reported a bill out to the House of Representatives on November
4, 1971 which was identical to HR 10681, but renumbered HR 11302.
HR 11302 was debated on November 15, 1971, and was passed by a
vote of 350 to 5. Three of the five Representatives voting
against HR 11302 spoke- in favor of S 1828 before the House in
the debate on November 4 and the rest of the time for debate
was taken up by Congressmen speaking in support of HR 11302.
The Administration's position during the House consideration
of S 1828 and HR 10681 in September, October, and November had
originally been one of support for S 1828. Nixon later indi-
cated that, he would accept either bill."
I. House and Senate Conference on S 1828
and- HR 11302, and Final Action of the Congress
S 1828 and HR 11302 were sent to a conference committee of
the House of Representatives and the Senate which reported out
a bill numbered "S 1828" on December 8, 1971. The new bill was
adopted by a vote of 85 to 0 in the Senlate and by a voice vote
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in the House, and was sent to the President who signed it into
law. The conference bill accepted all of th- provisions of
HR 11302 except as follows: The National Cancer Attack Program
was renamed the National Cancer Program. Only the director of
the NIH and the NCI would be appointed by the President. The
S 1828 provision for a 23 member National Cancer Advisory Board
(with 18 members appointed by the President) was accepted. The
House bill would have continued the then existing National Can-
cer Advisory Council.
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SUMMARY OF ISSUES IN THE CANCER RESEARCH DEBATE
Some indication of the issues related to the organization
of cancer research that were discussed in Congress have been
mentioned in the previous sections. The three major issues of
the cancer research debate are presented below; on each of
these issues the ACS ideology has a distinct position. In fact
the cancer research debate occurred because of the opposition
of some groups, chiefly biomedical researchers not engaged in
cancer research, to the recommendations of the National Panel,
which was an expression of the ACS-position and ideology.
Those opposed to the ACS position also included the Federation
of American Societies for Experimental Biology (FASEB), the
American Medical Association, the American Hospital Association,
the American Association of Medical Colleges, the American
College of Physicians, and several other major organizations
in the fields of medicine, medical teaching, and biomedical
research. Some of the persons who supported the ACS ideology
have been already identified, those who can be specifically
associated with the ACS-Lasker lobbying group. There is a
wider range of persons and groups who agree with or at some
point in the Congressional hearings espouse the ACS ideology;
a clear distinction should be made between the larger group of
supporters and the relatively small group of people who can be
associated definitely with Mary Lasker, and who made specific
efforts to influence Congress. This specific group contains
those people already cited and should al'so include the leaders
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of the national ACS organization. The wider group of indivi-
duals who support the ACS ideology include m7st scientists
engaged in cancer research, and administrators of cancer
research institutes and hospitals. The only major national
organization (which is not a Mary Lasker committee) which sup-
ports the ACS ideology is the American Association of Cancer
Researchers (AACR).
The three issues listed below were the major issues dis-
cussed in the cancer research debate. The opposing sides of
argument are indicated briefly:
A. Organization of Cancer Research
Many of the details of this discussion have been indicated
in the previous section. The ACS argued that cancer research
should be organized in an agency with a great amount of indepen-
dence, ideally as the National Panel recommended in a National
Cancer Authority, patterned after the NASA. The ACS argued
that such an independent agency would better develop a sense of
urgency and mission to fight cancer, and would better exploit
new leads and discoveries in cancer research. Opponents of the
ACS approach argued that the structure of the NCI and the NIH
should not be tampered with, that the NIH has conducted biomedi-
cal research in an excellent fashion in the past, that cancer
research was inseparable from the rest of biomedical research,
and defended the administrative and research abilities of the
NIH.
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B. Direction of Cancer Research
The ACS argued that cancer research sho ld be directed
towards areas of promise in cancer research, which the National
Panel report extensively indicated. The other side argued that
the best way to conduct cancer research is to attempt to dis-
cover the basic biochemical processes of cellular g'rowth and
control, since these basic mechanisms of life and their malfunc-
tioning, which causes cancer, are- not understood. A cancer
research program should support a broad range of biomedical
research in order to understand the basic mechanisms of life
and since,many discoveries which have offered insight into the
nature of cancer have occurred in areas of basic biomedical
research which originally seemed unrelated to the problem of
cancer.
C. Breakthrough Theories
The ACS argued that because of the present stage of cancer
research, a new and intense, well funded, and directed research
effort would lead to extraordinary advances in the cure and
treatment of cancer. The opponents to the ACS position argued
that breakthroughs in science are very hard to predict, and any
expectations about new discoveries related to cancer should be
very cautious.
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THE ACS IDEOLOGY
This section will describe in detail what the various
elements of the ACS ideology are and how they are ideological
according to the definition given in the previous section.
The ACS ideology does express the beliefs and purposes of
the group composed of cancer researchers, Mary Lasker, and the
ACS. In the hearings before the House Subcommittee of Public
Health and the Environment Dr. Pollard, President of the ACS,
states that "it has long been the policy of the ACS to urge the
Federal Government to make the conquest of cancer a national
priority and to establish it as a national goal." 5 5 The whole
intent of the ACS ideology and the ACS lobbying efforts in Con-
gress was aimed at producing new legislation which would make
cancer research a major national priority; the ACS arguments
that cancer research is on the verge of major breakthroughs is
a strong argument for a high investment in cancer research now
because the benefits of new treatments and cancer cures will be
quickly realized.
Another aim of the ACS-Lasker group, though not always
stated explicitly was to separate cancer research from the NIH;
Mary Lasker has stated that the NIH lacks "a sense of mission to
reduce the death rate directly" and "sense of urgency.","
Dr. Pollard recognizes that the NCI has done an "overwhelming
job" in the advancement of knowledge about cancer, but states
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that "progress and potential against this disease, both in the
research front and on the clinical treatment front, has out-
grown the dignified, rather impermeable character of the limited
mission of the Federal. biomedical research establishment, the
NIH.',5 7  Representative Carter, a member of the House Subcommit-
tee on Public Health and the Environment, who favored the ACS-
supported Senate bill, the second version of S 1828, states that
he feels that "the people in NCI, although they are good people,
are really not sufficiently knowledgeable [about cancer] to man-
age this great campaign [of cancer research],"5 and also states
that the people in the NCI are "incapable." 59 This suspicion
and disatisfaction with the administration of cancer research is
directly reflected in the National Panel recommendations for the
establishment of an independent National Cancer Authority, and
the comments of the Panel on the need for new organizational
arrangements in the administration of cancer research. The ACS
ideology adopts the same attitude and thinking about reorganiz-
ing cancer research.
A similar concern of the ACS-Lasker group underlies the
elements of the ACS ideology which call for a more directed
approach to cancer research, and the establishment of an indepen-
dent cancer research agency, and the National Panel recommenda-
tions for the establishment of a national network of cancer
research and training centers. This is a concern with a faster
"payoff" in terms of new cancer treatments from the money spent
on research.60  This concern is partly the cause of the dissa-
tisfaction of the ACS-Lasker group with the NIH and the NCI.
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There is another purpose or interest of the ACS-Lasker
group which the campaign for a new cancer re earch effort would
fulfill, and which underlies the ACS ideology, though there is
no direct evidence and these comments are somewhat speculative.
This purpose is the enhancement of the status and prestige of
of the ACS-Lasker group, for if legislation is passed (which
indeed was passed) which makes cancer research a higher and
more visible national priority, then the status of the group
which pushed for this legislation (Mary Lasker, the ACS, cancer
researchers, and others) and the status of the major national
organization which is concerned with cancer, the ACS, is enhanced.
Economic interests were also a factor in the motivation of
those who did or did not support the ACS ideology. Most cancer
researchers and administrators of cancer research institutes
supported the ideology, which would organize cancer research in
such a way as to support institutes and researchers engaged
specifically in cancer research (see the discussion of the
directed research element of the ACS ideology below). Biomedical
researchers argued that cancer research should be pursued by a
broad support of all branches of biomedical research, even if
some of these branches seem now to be unrelated to the problems
of cancer. -It seems that many biomedical researchers expressed
an organization of research philosophy which was congenial to
the type of research they were individually engaged in.
Of course, the major motivation for the ACS lobbying effort
is the strong personal and emotional reaction of the persons in
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the ACS-Lasker group to the disease, cancer. This feeling is
part of and is behind the whole ACS ideology.
It has been suggested that an ideology will arise in a
social group when that group is in conflict with other groups
in attempting to achieve its own aims, and when this conflict
arises in a situation of competition for scarce resources.
The ACS-Lasker group was certainly in such a situation, for
there is certainly great competition among different interests
for the allocation of Federal funds to different areas and
interests. In order to request a dramatic increase in the
funding. of cancer research, the ACS-Lasker group had to present
a strong argument for their position; the ACS-Lasker group knew
that it faced opposition from other groups on some of the changes
that it wanted to see implemented. This opposition would and did
come from scientists and biomedical researchers opposed to the
ACS-Lasker position on the need for an independent cancer agency
and the need for more directed cancer research. The ACS ideology
arose in response to this situation of conflict, as presenting a
strong argument for the ACS position, and as expressing the
interests and beliefs of the ACS-Lasker group.
The rest of this section will contain: a brief summary of
the definition of ideology presented in the previous section, a
summary of the elements of the ACS ideology, a section discussing
each of the elements of that ideology, and discussion of the dif-
ferent specific positions of the ACS group (as specific expres-
sions of the ACS ideology) during different periods of the dis-
cussion in Congress on cancer research.
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Ideology can be defined as a system of beliefs and thoughts
with the following characteristics:
1. Elements or statements of the ideology are accepted as
true by the proponents of the ideology, even if not "objectively"
true.
2. The intensity of belief with respect to the elements or
statements of the ideology is strong.
3. Elements of the ideology are mutually supporting.
4. The ideology provides a comprehensive viewpoint with
regard to the area of interest which. is the focus of the ideology.
Elements of the American Cancer Society Ideology:
1. Cancer is an extremely serious and horrifying disease.
Research into the causes and nature of cancer should be given
high national priority.
2. Biomedical research into the causes and treatment of
cancer is now at such a level that a well funded program of
directed research will yield extraordinary advances in the rate
of cancer cures in a few years. (This element is also known as
the "breakthrough theory.")
3. Research into the causes and treatment of cancer should
be in "areas of promise" in biomedical research which are likely
to provide new effective treatments for cancer or specific can-
cers, or in areas of what can be called basic biomedical research
but with an awareness of the potential clinical application of
any discoveries.
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4. Cancer research should not be organized as it presently
is within the NIH with most cancer research centered within the
NCI. A cancer research program, whether within the NIH or out-
side of it, should be autonomous and be subordinate directly to
the President. It should be able to present its budget requests
and reports directly to the President (rather than through the
NIH and the Department of HEW).
The above elements will be referred to as follows: the
first element will be referred to as the "seriousness of cancer"
element; the second, as the "breakthrough theory;" the third ele-
ment, as the "directed research" element; and the fourth, as the
"cancer research organization" element.
The following is a discussion of each of the four elements
of the ACS ideology:
A. First Element of the ACS Ideology:
The Seriousness of Cancer
Cancer is regarded as an extremely serious disease by
those who articulate the ACS ideology; personal comments on the
disease tend to be strong and emotional. Dr. Pollard of the ACS,
for instance, regards the cancer problem as one "which affects
more people in the U.S. more emotionally and desperately than
any other.""1 Persons who do not fully support the ACS ideology
also consider cancer to be a serious disease, but the group iden-
tified with the ACS ideology usually make stronger statements on
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the seriousness of cancer than do other persons involved in the
cancer research organization discussion in Congress.
A statement by Dr. Rhoads, past president of the ACS, indi-
cates his intensive concern about the disease, and presents a
concrete and graphic picture of cancer, during the House hear-
ings on cancer research, as follows:
I have a fear that as the debate continues we are
becoming so involved in the polemics that we are
losing sight of the central issue. I find that we
are no longer talking about the child who is going to
die of leukemia, or the wife who is going to have her
breast removed, or the young man--like Freddy Stein-
mark, who I accompanied to the White House after his
leg was amputated. As you know, this brilliant young
football player no longer is in the land of the living.
The central issue, of course, is to find cures or more effective
treatments for the various kinds of cancer.
Senator Yarborough in his speech before Congress in March,
1970, introducing Senate Resolution 376, which authorized the
National Panel, refers to cancer as "this vicious disease,."
which has cursed the "family of man since the beginning of
recorded history."6 3 Yarborough goes on to quote at length a
speech given in the Senate on May 18, 1928, by Senator Matt
Neeley of West Virginia (who died of cancer in 1958):
I propose to speak of a monster that is more insatiate
than the guillotine; more irresistible than the might-
iest army that ever marched to battle: more terrify-
ing than any other scourge that has ever threatened
the existence of the human race. The name of this
loathsome, deadly and insatiate monster is cancer. It
is older than the human race. Evidence of cancer has
been found in the f*ossil remains of a serpent that is
supposed to have lived millions of years ago. Records
made on papyri by the ancient Egyptians show that the
cancer curse was known in the valley of the Nile more
than 2000 years before the birth of Christ."
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Senator Yarborough also refers to the day in 1957 when Matt
Neeley was brought to the Senate in a wheelchair to see
Yarborough sworn in as a Senator.
.Senator Hubert Humphrey in his testimony before the Senate
Subcommittee on Health in support of S 34, the bill the ACS sup-
ported, repeats the same quote that is presented immediately
above. 65 Humphrey states that the "agony of cancer is indescrib-
able t " and feels that the funding levels recommended for S 34
Cwhich are also the National Panel recommendations) of up to
one billion dollars funding per year by 1976 are entirely justi-
fied.
Senator Jackson, who spoke after Senator Yarborough at the
introduction of Senate Resolution 376 in March, 1970, refers to
himself as a long-time supporter of cancer research funding, and
states that "I believe that we must conquer cancer and that we
must do it now." He quotes in full a letter from a nineteen-
year-old from Washington State who has leukemia. Among other
things the writer of the letter states that he wants the Senator
to influence the Congress to "PUSH" for more cancer research,
that "I pray every day a cure for leukemia will be found," and
that "you don't understand the agony o.f cancer until you come in
contact with this killer personally."6 7
Representative Pickle, who supports the ACS ideology, refers
to the fear of cancer as "the great restlessness, the great
uneasiness that pervades our Nation," in his additional comments
at the end of the report of the House Interstate and Foreign
Commerce Committee on HR 11302.
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Representative Rooney makes a relatively dispassionate
statement in support of S 1828 (the ACS-supported bill) in the
House hearings. His concern about cancer is indicated by his
sponsorship of House Concurrent Resolution 675 in 1970, which
was later passed by the whole Congress. That resolution referred
to cancer as "the greatest scourge in history."'9 In the same
hearings he also refers to the bill he introduced to the House
of Representatives, in 1947, the "first of many," which called
for a "national drive to eliminate cancer.""7
All of the individuals mentioned above--Dr. Pollard,
Dr. Rhoads, Senator Yarborough, Senator Humphrey, Senator Jackson,
Representative Pickle, and Representative Rooney--are associated
with the ACS-Lasker lobbying group, or have indicated their sup-
port for the ACS ideology through the bills they have supported
or by their statements. Virtually all Congressmen and scientists
who spoke and testified before Congress and in hearings on cancer
research expressed their own agreement that cancer is a serious
and major disease and that more money should be appropriated for
cancer research. Very few, however, make as strong statements
about cancer as those cited above, which are the strongest and
most emotional statements on cancer research made before the
Congress or its subcommittees, except for a statement by President
Nixon.
The President., in a statement introducing his own legislation
for the reorganization of cancer research, refers to his "very
deep personal concern" abbut the problem of cancer.71 He also
refers to three persons he has known who have died of cancer, his
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aunt, Senator Robert Taft, and John Foster Dulles. The President
thus has an intense concern about cancer, which is as strong as
that expressed by persons clearly supporting the ACS ideology.
The President, however, took different positions in the discus-
sion of cancer research in Congress, and at points supported the
ACS ideology. His behavior was probably caused by the changing
politics of the situation, and the apparent rivalry between him-
self and Senator Kennedy over the two bills that each sponsored."
Thus, with the exception of the President, the persons sup-
porting the ACS ideology express stronger feelings about cancer
as a serious problem than the rest of Congress and the other
scientists who testified before the hearings on cancer research.
The strong feeling of those who supported the ACS ideology with
respect to this first element of the ideology indicates that the
ACS ideology conforms to the second characteristic of ideology--
the intensity of belief with respect to the elements of the ideo-
logy is strong. There is a very strong belief in the seriousness
of cancer.
The statements of the above proponents of the ACS ideology
indicate that the ACS thinking about cancer gives the ideology a
definitive and comprehensive view of health problems and bio-
medical research. ACS thinking defines what is of first priority
in these fields, cancer and cancer research, and considers the
problem of other diseases or health problems as secondary. This
is the kind of viewpoint. an ideology is likely to take, and
represents the fourth characteristic of ideology, that the ideo-
logy does provide a comprehensive viewpoint with regard to the
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area of interest which is the focus of the ideology.
All the elements of the ACS ideology are interrelated, and
provide a coherent program and justification for research
directed against cancer, which is how the third characteristic
of ideology states that an ideology will be structured. The
first element of the ideology is related to the ACS program for
cancer research; for if cancer is taken to be the most horrify-
ing health problem confronting Americans, which is the ACS view-
point, then the level of funding, at least, (if not the organi-
zational arrangements) the ACS would like to see implemented is
justified. Drs. Pollard and Rhoads of the ACS argue that the
seriousness of cancer and other factors make it imperative that
the National Panel recommendations on the organization of can-
cer research be followed. If these recommendations are not
followed then cancer research will not provide as quickly new
methods of effective treatment for cancer. A statement by
Benno Schmidt, chairman of the National Panel, in testimony
before the House Subcommittee expresses this position:
The cancer program, in order to succeed, needs the
same independence in management, planning, budget
presentation, and assessment of progress that those
programs [the atom or space programs] needed, and
in those respects the independent-authority analogy
is a valid one.
. . . we felt that an independent authority was neces-
sary if we were going to carry out the congressional
mandate of making cancer a "national crusade.1 7 2 a
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B. Second Element: Breakthrough Theories
Senator Yarborough in his statements before Congress in
1970 is very optimistic about future advances in cancer research.
He says that a cure or cures for cancer can be found by 1976 if
a sufficient effort is made. 7 3 He quotes statements by scien-
tists which are extremely optimistic about the development of
vaccines against the as yet undiscovered viruses which cause
human cancer, and predicts that small scale testing of humans
could begin by 1973,4 He also refers to the opinions of
scientists he has spoken to who predict that slow growing can-
cer tumors may be controlled chemically by 1976.75 Most drugs
found effective against cancer affect rapidly growing cancers,
rather than the slow growing cancers.
In the House hearings Drs. Pollard and Rhoads argue that
cancer research is at a point such that new discoveries will lead
to great advances in the cure of cancer and that these advances
will probably occur soon. A well funded program of cancer
research, such as proposed in the second version of S 1828, will
lead more quickly to discoveries or "breakthroughs" and exploit
them more quickly.7 6 In an article on cancer research by
Sir Alexander Haddow quoted by Dr. Pollard, Haddow thinks that
cancer research is at a "watershed," and is "enthusiastic" about
finding new treatment methods quickly.77
Similar opinions have repeatedly been stated by the members
of the National Panel of Consultants on the Conquest of Cancer in
their testimony before Congress. Dr. Scott at the House hearings
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on cancer research recognizes that cancer is not a single
disease and that a single cure for cancer will probably not be
found, but states that there exist "vast new insights" which
can "in a relatively short period of time make vast inroads on
the cancer problem as we know it today," given the proper organ-
ization and funding for cancer research.7 8 Dr. Holland in tes-
timony before the Senate discussing cancer research states that
"the recognizable goals in research are such that I believe a
greater effort can and should be sustained, one that can and
should be successful." 7 9 Other members of the National Panel
who testified in favor of the breakthrough theory are Benno
Schmidt, chairman of the National Panel, Dr. R. L. Clark, and
Dr. Sidney Farber.80 Dr. Holland in his statements before a
February, 1971 Senate luncheon for the National Panel forecasts
a future decrease in cancer mortality; and in one of the few
statements during 1971 by a spokesman for the ACS ideology which
makes a specific prediction for the future reduction of cancer
mortality, Dr. Holland states that he expects cancer mortality
to eventually fall from the present 65% of those who have cancer
to 10%.81
Several Congressmen also express some variant of the break-
through theory in their statements. Representative John Rooney
states his belief that scientific knowledge grows in "quantum
jumps" and declares that "we are now at the point where we
approach the very real goal of a major breakthrough on the cure
of cancer."8 2 Representatives Carter and Nelsen, who are on the
House Subcommittee on Public Health and the Environment and who
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both supported S 1828, both express support for the breakthrough
theory."3 Senator Kennedy makes a cautious statement that there
is a "base for the belief that there will be progress. "8 4
There is a specific theory in connection with the potential
of virology in the development of a cure for cancer which should
be mentioned at this point. The theory is extensively referred
to in the report of the National Panel, and is supported by many
members of the ACS-Lasker group. It is the controversial theory
of Robert J. Huebner, who is now associated with the NCI, which
states how some suspected human cancer viruses function.
Huebner's "oncogene" theory ("onco" literally means "cancer")
proposes that the C-type virus particle which has been associated
with human cancers, but which has been found in normal tissues
also, is a cancer gene which exists in normal tissues and is
duplicated along with the rest of the genetic material of the
cell when the cell divides. The oncogene is usually dormant but
when activated by radiation, by a carcinogenic compound, or by
other factors takes control of the cell and makes it cancerous.
The theory is neat and has a certain amount of plausibility, but
little in the way of hard evidence to support it. It does imply
that there is one cause for all kinds of cancer, which is also an
implication that one cure could be found for all cancers, through
a vaccine or drug which would destroy or inhibit the oncogene.'
Most scientists and biomedical, but not cancer, researchers
believe that the optimisin expressed by the scientists and Con-
gressmen referred to above, and in the Huebner theory is not jus-
tified. The counterargument to the breakthrough theory is that
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the basic biochemistry and mechanisms of cancer are still not
understood, and that it is extremely difficult to predict when
new discoveries will be made in scientific research. Dr. Cooper
of the American Association of Medical Colleges states this posi-
tion as follows:
The fact is that even the most feverish quest by the
biomedical research community for solutions to the
various cancers that afflict mankind will, of neces-
sity, involve a painstakingly methodical and unnervingly
meticulous process. There is no instant cure. 86
C. Third Element: Directed Research
There are two kinds of directed research relevant to the
debate: 1. one kind is the direction of research to "areas of
promise" which indicate a potential for the discovery of new
treatment methods; 2. the other is an approach to basic bio-
medical research.
Dr. Rhoads states the first approach in the following way:
"Basic research in the field of cancer is very much in order." 7
Benno Schmidt, in introducing Dr. Holland, a member of the
National Panel, to the House Subcommittee on Public Health and
the Environment states that Dr. Holland will "give us a very
brief insight into some of the reasons for the feeling that
recent advances in the knowledge of cancer have opened up far
more promising areas for intensive investigation than have even
heretofore existed."8 8  Dr, Holland then proceeds to discuss
several areas of promise in cancer research which are very simi-
lar to the areas outlined in the National Panel report, and
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which would be the areas of research to be subjected to inten-
sive investigation.
Ten areas are specifically set forth in the summary and
recommendations section of the National Panel report: These
areas are "the identification of the factors that cause cancer,
viruses causing cancer, cell and tumor biology, immunology or
the host resistance against cancer, epitomology or the variables
in cancer incidence, cancer preventative measures, improved
diagnosis, chemotherapy or the use of drug techniques, radio-
therapy and surgery.""" The National Panel in several places in
its report indicates the areas of cancer research that will be
likely to lead to advances in cancer treatment, and in which
research should be concentrated.90 These various areas of
research do look promising, though there is usually some major
obstacle to the quick application of the current level of know-
ledge about a particular area to the treatment of cancer
research, or some further discovery to be made. Some examples
of these areas of promise are described below.
One is. the field of virology. The report states that can-
cer viruses probably do exist in humans, because of the proven
existence of cancer viruses in animals and the identification
of some viruses in connection with specific forms of human
viruses. No virus, however, has been discovered which has been
proven to cause cancer in humans. Other specific research areas
discussed are immunotherapy, in connection with strengthening
the body's immune reaction to cancers; chemotherapy, the dis-
covery of new anti-cancer drugs; research connected with
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interferon, a substance produced by the body which has shown to
be successful in combating some animal cancers, but which is very
hard to obtain; and research connected with TAF. TAF, or "tumor
angiogenesis factor" is a substance produced by malignant tumors
which stimulates the growth of a network of blood vessels in and
for the tumor. In the absense of such a factor, or if it could
be inhibited, cancer tumors would not grow beyond a fairly small
size. The finding of a drug or a mechanism to counteract TAF
requires much further work.91
It would seem appropriate at this point to have a brief dis-
cussion of the- biology of cancer, for the argument about directed
research is partly about the nature of scientific discovery and
partly about the nature of cancer. A cell becomes malignant when
the normal controls on cell growth are interferred with, and the
cell grows in an unlimited manner. The growth and activities of
the normal cell are regulated by the genes and DNA of the cell;
cancer involves a malfunction in the normal mechanisms of cell
control by the genes of the nucleus. Basic research in molecular
biology.is important because the biochemistry, on the microbio-
logical level, of the control of the cell's activities are not
understood, and the understanding of the basic mechanisms of con-
trol should lead to insight as to the malfunction in these mech-
anisms which cause cancer-. This point is the argument of those
opposed to the position of the ACS ideology.
Cancerous cells and tumors also vary greatly in their indivi-
dual metabolism, for they usually maintain some of the character-
istics of the normal cells from which they developed, and the
68
variety and function of cells in an organism is enormous. Cancer-
ous cells may carry out some of the functions of the normal cells
from which they developed, but are likely to be a less special-
ized and more primitive version of the normal cell. Cancer cells
are metabolically different from normal cells but no metabolic
characteristic has been found which separates all cancer cells
from all normal cells. This variety in the nature of.cancer
cells and among different cancer cells is the basis for the
description of cancer as not one disease but a group of diseases,
and for the pessimism of most scientists about the discovery of
any kind of single cure for cancer.
The other kind of directed research which is mentioned is
an approach to basic biomedical research. This approach has the
same underlying philosophy as the other type of directed research
discussed above: research should be pursued in a way such that
new treatments for cancer will be discovered as rapidly as pos-
sible and will be put into use as quickly. In the discussion of
the best approach to take towards basic biomedical research, a
connection is made between the approach of the research and what
is thought to be the best organization of research. Dr. Rhoads
in the House hearings is discussing how research will be directed
under the National Cancer Agency (or Cancer Conquest Agency),
which is referred to in the second version of S 1828; he refers
to the importance of a national network of cancer centers and
states:
As applicable information emerges from basic science
laboratories, however, we will be able also to mount
large-scale clinical trials where indicated, not only
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to bring any new therapeutic benefits to people
rapidly, but to provide a rapid feedback to the
laboratory scientist so that he will know whether
to pursue the direction he has taken or to pursue
an alternative direction. 9 2
Dr. Farber, also in testimony before the House Subcommittee
affirms the need for directed research, and also indicates the
ACS-Lasker group's dissatisfaction with the NIH, a dissatisfac-
tion which underlies the ACS ideology elements of directed
research and cancer research organization. He says:
The whole history of the NIH in the clinical applica-
tion and investigation has been one of slow progress, in
part because of the belief on the part of many scien-
tists in the country too that only by basic research
yielding a full understanding of the nature of cancer
can proper clinical treatment of cancer be achieved.
We cannot wait for full understanding; the 325,000
patients with cancer who are going to die this year
cannot wait; nor is it necessary, in order to make
great progress in the cure of cancer, for us to have
the full solution of all of the problems of basic
research.93
Opponents of the ACS ideology on directed research argue
that not enough is known about the basic nature of cancer to
separate out certain areas of biomedical research as areas of
promise for the development of treatments for cancer. They
argue that the way to pursue "cancer research"' is to pursue
broad based research in the biomedical sciences, and the approach
that Dr. Farber mentions will not produce a cure for cancer any
faster or as fast and is likely to end up spending money in
lines of research that will prove fruitless. These scientists
point out that the interrelations in the field of biomedicine
are such that discoveries relevant to cancer are likely to occur
in areas thought previously to be unrelated to the cancer problem.
70
A letter from the AMA, which was sent to the House Subcommittee
and which is later quoted in the report of that subcommittee on
HR 11302, refers to nine significant biomedical discoveries
related to cancer, which were made by scientists working at the
NIH in institutes and divisions other than the NCI. 9 ' A quote
by Dr. James Shannon which is referred to several times during
the hearings on cancer research expresses the above position
(Dr. Shannon is past director of the NIH.): "The inescapable
fact is that biomedical science is a complex, interrelated,
n-dimensional universe . . . . This reality animates the pro-
cesses that the scientific community has institutionalized in
the NIH, to view biomedical sciences, to the extent possible,
holistically.' 95
These biomedical researchers are opposed also to the ACS
approach to basic biomedical research. The argument is similar
to the one advanced above: the best way to pursue cancer research
is through the support of biomedical research. The ACS approach
to biomedical research as articulated, with such a consciousness
of clinical application of results, would not encourage the free
investigation of diverse areas which will as quickly as is pos-
sible indicate the mechanisms of and effective treatments for
cancer.
D. Fourth Element: Cancer Research Organization
The ACS ideology proVides support for an autonomous cancer
research program. It is argued that an independent cancer
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research agency and other organizational measures are necessary
in order for the new more intensive cancer research effort to
succeed quickly in finding new treatments or cures for cancer.
An independent cancer research agency would also serve as an
indication of the high priority that is being given to cancer
research. This element of the ideology was expressed in a
series of specific recommendations for the reorganization of
cancer research which were initially presented to Congress in
the recommendations of the National Panel report, many of which
were included as provisions in the final legislation. These
specific recommendations were discussed at length and supported
with detailed comments by supporters of the ACS ideology during
the hearings held on cancer research.
This element of the ideology was also expressed as an atti-
tude concerning what should be the proper way to conduct and
organize cancer research, and as a negative evaluation of the
present organization and administrative procedures of the NIH
and the NCI. This attitude underlies the formulation and sup-
port of the specific recommendations cited above and underlies
the directed research element of the ACS ideology. This atti-
tude is the feeling that the present cancer research agency, the
NCI, lacks a strong feeling of urgency about the cancer problem,
and does not have the organizational arrangements and a strong
concern for the rapid application of new discoveries in cancer
research to the treatment of cancer patients. The NCI, accord-
ing to this attitude is really not set up organizationally for
the rapid application of new research discoveries to clinical
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treatment. It should be recalled that this concern with the
application of research discoveries (both in cancer research
and biomedical research generally) is felt by Mary Lasker, her
associates, and the group described as the ACS-Lasker lobbying
group.
The specific recommendations of the ACS ideology for the
reorganization of cancer can be summarized as follows (from the
National Panel report): an independent cancer research agency
should absorb the NCI and conduct cancer research, additional
cancer research and training centers should be established to
form a national network of such centers, and a comprehensive
national program plan for the pursuit of cancer research should
be established. These three items are the chief recommendations
of the National Panel with respect to organization. In addition,
there was a recommendation that a National Cancer Advisory Board
be set up to supersede the presently existing National Advisory
Cancer Council; the chief difference between the Board and the
-Council is that the Board has some official power rather than
only advisory power. Of course there was also a recommendation
to greatly increase cancer funding over a period of five years.
The recommendation for an independent cancer research agency
perhaps most directly reflects feelings of dissatisfaction with
the NIH. An analogy is repeatedly made by the National Panel and
by other proponents of the ACS ideology between the proposed
National Cancer Authority and the NASA and the AEC. This analogy
indicates the depth of seriousness with which cancer is viewed as
a problem and the very high priority which the ideology would
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like to see given cancer research, for these two agencies are
associated with two of the most spectacular and impressive
accomplishments of Western man and American scientific effort:
the sending of men to the moon, and the development of atomic
weapons and atomic energy.
Dr. Clark, a member of the National Panel expresses some
of the arguments advanced in favor of establishing an indepen-
dent cancer research agency:
In the past when the federal government has desired
to give top priority to a major scientific project
of the magnitude of that involved in the conquest
of cancer, it has on occasion, with considerable
success, given the responsibility for the project to
an independent agency. ~Such an agency provides a
degree of independence in management, planning, bud-
get presentation, and assessment of progress which
is difficult if not impossible to achieve in a large
government department.
We believe that it is important to get this program
out from under the six tiers of bureaucracy that over-
lay it today, that we must eliminate the delays and
duplication in decision making, and have an Adminis-
trator responsible for cancer who is not subordinate
to those responsible for eleven other health insti-
tutes and multiple health programs.17
Senator Javits indicates his support for the National Cancer
Authority, and also indicates that President Nixon, who did not
specifically support the idea of the Authority, drew the same
analogy in his statement before the Senate hearings:
I introduced . . . S 34, to launch a national effort
for the cure of cancer similar to the Manhattan Project,
which made the atomic bomb a reality, or the Moon Shot
Program, which planted human footsteps on the moon. I
believe the theme of this legislative proposal for a
National Cancer Authority, despite what the Department
of HEW has made its position, was implicit in the
President's State of the Union Message, where he said:
"The same kind of concentrated effort that split the
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atom and took man to the moon should be turned toward
conquering this dread disease." 98
The thinking and position of the ideology about cancer
research centers has been indicated in the discussion of directed
research. Cancer research centers were seen as a means of aiding
research conducted with the aim of defeating cancer. The cancer
centers are also seen as providing a means for the communication
of knowledge about new cancer treatment methods to physicians as
soon as a line of research produces an effective treatment pro-
cedure.
Mr. Benno Schmidt expresses the attitude and position of
those supporting the ACS ideology on a comprehensive plan for
cancer research, in comments in March, 1971, before the Senate
Subcommittee on Health:
I did not find Dr. Baker [director of the NCI] quite
as explicit as I found him in discussing that pro-
blem [planning in the NCI] with me. There is no
overall plan. As he said yesterday, he didn't say
there was, but he said there are plans on this and
plans on that. There are plans on this and plans
on that, but the thing that is absent in the planning
area is a comprehensive overall plan for a coherent
and systematic attack on cancer. That is not present
today.99
These comments again indicate a dissatisfaction with the NIH and
the NCI. Dr. Rhoads in testimony before the Senate hearings
expresses the same attitude well:
In supporting the administrative structure offered
in S 34, we have clearly in mind the objective of
cancer control, the concept of urgency, and the need
for a goal-oriented, strategically designed research
program, carefully planned to make maximum utiliza-
tion of all available and relevant manpower and
resources. A critical requirement here is to have
a mechanism that will guarantee the ability to move
very rapidly when a clear opportunity [along a line
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of cancer research] opens up. We need the type of
mechanism that will enable us to move beyond the
restrictions on research administration that we now
have. To do this there must be clear authority,
and clear lines of responsibility.'"*
Another major concern that was expressed in the attitude
towards cancer research organization of the ideology was a con-
cern with Presidential involvement in the cancer research pro-
gram. Part of the reasoning behind the creation of the National
Cancer Authority is that this move would decrease the adminis-
trative layers between the cancer program and the President.
The President would be able to monitor the research program,
and indicate his interest in the program. This attitude about
the President's involvement indicates as do other attitudes the
high priority that cancer research should be given, for the
President himself would be overseeing the research program, if
*not on a day-to-day basis certainly at frequent intervals.
The argument advanced against the proposals for the
National Cancer Authority and the proposal of S 1828 for an
independent Cancer Conquest Agency within the NIH was in ways
similar to the arguments advanced against the directed research
and breakthrough theories. Scientists and biomedical research-
ers not engaged in cancer research argued that the complexity
and interrelationships of biomedicine and biology meant that
the separation of cancer research organizationally from the rest
of Federal biomedical research within the NIH would be detri-
mental to both areas of research. These researchers argued that
the provisions of S 34 and S 1828 which declared that coopera-
tion and coordination with other research areas would and should
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be preserved by the independent cancer research agency (the
National Cancer Authority, or the Cancer Conquest Agency) would*
not insure the preservation of the present high level of coor-
dination and interrelationship that exists within the NIH. The
lack of knowledge about the basic mechanisms of cancer and the
many past discoveries relevant to cancer which have occurred in
apparently unrelated areas of biomedical research are both
pieces of evidence which indicate that cancer research should
not be removed from the NIH. The above arguments were applied
to both S 34 and S 1828 because the researchers in "basic bio-
medicine" felt, as did many Congressmen and observers of the
cancer research discussion, that the independence of the Cancer
Conquest Agency was so extreme as to render the words "within
NIH," which are contained in S 1828, almost meaningless.
The ACS ideology does have the characteristics of ideology
which have been outlined. With reference to the belief charac-
teristic--i.e., the statements or elements of the ideology are
accepted as true--by the proponents of the ideology, I think it
is clear that the persons who articulate this ideology believe
what they are saying; they are usually emphatic in their state-
ments.
With reference to the strength of belief characteristic--
i.e., the belief in the statements of the ideology is strong--
it was made clear that the proponents of the ACS ideology are
very serious in their concern about cancer and in their belief
that it is an extremely serious health problem. They are empha-
tic about their agreement with and support for other elements,
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besides Element One of the ideology, and are more strongly com-
mitted to the statements expressed in these other elements than
other scientists, Congressmen, and laymen.
With reference to the mutual support characteristic--
i.e., the elements of an ideology are mutually supporting--the
interrelations of the various elements of the ACS ideology have
been already indicated. These interrelationships may-be sum-
marized as follows: Recent advances in certain areas of cancer
research, the areas of promise, indicate that cancer research
is on the verge of one or many breakthroughs. A cancer research
program of directed research, aimed at these areas of promise,
well funded, organized for planning and flexibility to pursue
new lines of research as they arise, and highly motivated to
find new treatments and cures for cancer and to bring new
research results to the patient, will best take advantage of
the imminent breakthroughs in cancer research. The recent ad-
vances in cancer research have given us enough knowledge to
invest large amounts of money in specific areas of promise in
research- without wasting the money pursuing fruitless lines of
research. Even if there is some wastage in research expenditures
the seriousness of cancer, which is the number-one health pro-
blem in America, justifies an intensive cancer research effort.
With regard to the comprehensive characteristic of ideology--
i.e., provision of a comprehensive viewpoint with respect to its
area of interest--it is clear that the proponents of the cancer
research ideology regard cancer research as the major priority
in the field of health and biomedical research.
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E. Different Positions Taken
by Proponents of the ACS Ideology
The ACS ideology, as it has been stated, was stated in
general terms. During 1970 and 1971 persons who articulated
the ideology expressed different variants of elements of the
ideology. The different expressions of elements of the ideology
occurred chiefly with respect to the breakthrough theory and the
cancer research organization elements of the ideology.
The optimism of different proponents of the ideology about
cancer research breakthroughs varied over time, and chiefly
between 1970 and 1971. Senator Yarborough and Representative
John Rooney in their statements during 1970 before the National
Panel report was issued (in December, 1970) were very optimistic
and even expressed the hope that cancer could be cured by 1976.
They suggested that date as a target date for a cancer research
program. Statements made in 1971, with very few exceptions,
were less optimistic, and used such phrases as "future extra-
ordinary. advances in the treatment of cancer." The statements
of Representative Rooney(1971) and those contained in the National
Panel report were less optimistic. The change in tone about
breakthroughs after the National Panel report was issued pro-
bably reflected a sensitivity to the criticisms that were made
by scientists to the breakthrough theory.
The position of the ACS and other supporters of the ideology
also changed regarding cancer research organization, which was in
response to the changing legislative situation. S 34, which
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called for the establishment of a National Cancer Authority,
was originally supported by the ACS and other proponents of
the ideology; then the Senate "compromise" bill, S 1828, was
fully.supported. It is true that the Cancer Conquest Agency
of S 1828 is a very independent agency, so that the support
of S 1828 is a small change in position from the support of
S 34.
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THE ACS IDEOLOGY AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
Relationships between the ACS ideology and the cancer
research discussion in Congress in 1970 and 1971 have been dis-
cussed in the foregoing sections. The ACS ideology represents
the beliefs and interests of the ACS-Lasker group and cancer
researchers about the problem of cancer. The lobbying efforts
of the ACS-Lasker group placed the cancer research issue
before Congress and assured that the issue would remain alive,
and these efforts led to the production of the National Panel
of Consultants on the Conquest of Cancer report. This report
expressed the ACS ideology and was the major mechanism by
which the lobbying group influenced Congress and led to the
development of legislation which reflected many of the state-
ments and recommendations called for by the ACS ideology.
The influence of the ACS-Lasker group and the ACS ideology
was not- the only factor affecting the cancer research debate
in Congress. There were two other factors which should be dis-
cussed at this point. One was the concern of Congressmen with
the reactions of their constituency. The other factor was the
personal fear of many Congressmen of cancer.
Congressmen were aware that their constituents felt that
cancer was a serious problem, but were particularly aware of
the way a vote against or even abstention from voting on a
resolution on cancer research or a bill on cancer research
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(even if the vote were based on the organizational issue)
might be interpreted by their constituents,-i.e., as a vote
against cancer research and in "favoij'of cancer. Senator
Dominick indicates that he is aware of this factor in a state-
ment during the Senate hearings: "there has been a good deal
of comment in my own State over the fact I have not cospon-
sored S 34, the general theory being if you don't cosponsor
it you are in favor of cancer and against people." 1 0 1  The
Senator later introduced S 1828 to the Senate.
The other factor in the cancer research debate is the
so-called "immortality" theory referred to by Elizabeth Drew
in her article on the politics of biomedical research.'0 2
Drew argues that much'of the support in Congress for biomedi-
cal research in Congress has been generated by the concern of
legislators with extending the human lifespan, and carried to
the extreme, their concern with attempting to "buy" immortal-
ity through- the support of biomedical research. Much research
is aimed at the "degenerative" diseases, or diseases which
afflict largely the elderly: cancer, heart disease, and stroke.
This concern is largely a personal concern of the legislators
who are aware of their own increasing age. Drew argues that
this specific concern has been utilized by the Lasker lobby-
ing group through the technique of pointing out to the legis-
lators persons known to Congress or members of Congress who
have died of these diseases.
It is clear that some Congressmen associated with the
Lasker-ACS group did refer to their friends, associates, and
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other Congressmen who have had cancer, including Senators
Yarborough and Jackson, and Representative Pepper. But many
Congressmen not specifically associated with the ACS-Lasker
group or supporting the ACS ideology, and President Nixon
also referred to their friends, family, or associates who had
had cancer. Thus while the ACS-Lasker group did use this
technique of pointing out to Congressmen their mortality and
vulnerability, it seems that Congressmen were aware of it any-
way. It properly should not be considered an expression of
the ACS ideology specifically but an expression of the concern
and awareness of Congressmen of their own vulnerability and
the widespread incidence of cancer (the second major cause of
death in the United States), through their own personal con-
tact with it.
The National Panel report was the specific mechanism
through which the ideology and specific program, as expressed
in the ideology, of the ACS-Lasker group was largely accepted
by Congress. The "White Paper" device of the lobbying group
succeeded. The National Panel report was accepted as the
authoritative study of the cancer research issue. The various
bills presented to Congress were justified in terms of refer-
ence to the National Panel report, including the bill passed
by the House which totally rejected the independent cancer
research agency concept but included other specific recommenda-
tions of the National Panel.
The bill which was passed by the Senate on cancer research,
S 1828, which followed directly the recommendations of the
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National Panel, was reported out of the Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare on June 29, 1971. This report on S 1828
refers extensively to the National Panel report. It reprints
in full the eight pages of summary and recommendations which
make up the first section of the National Panel report. 103
Also included in this report are five pages of a summary of
areas of promise for cancer research taken directly from the
National Panel report.1 0 4  The committee report specifically
summarizes the National Panel argument and comments on the
National Cancer Authority, in a section discussing the pro-
vision of S 1828 for a Cancer Conquest Agency. This section
comments on the reason for the establishment of an independent
agency within the NIH for cancer research as a compromise
between the recommendation of the National Panel report and
the arguments of scientists and biomedical researchers in
favor of preserving the then present structure of the NIH.)0 .5
The debate and discussion on the floor of the Senate
about S 1828 also contains extensive references to the National
Panel report as the authority and justification behind the
bill, S 1828, produced by the committee. Senator Kennedy had
the summary and recommendations of the National Panel, and the
summary of areas of promise in cancer research from the
National Panel report included in the Congressional Record in
support of S 1828.10 In addition a letter from Benno Schmidt,
chairman of the National Panel, explaining the views and recom-
mendations of the National Panel was also included in the
Record. 107
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It is significant that the House bill on cancer research
is extensively supported and justified by r--ferences to the
National Panel report, because the House bill, HR 11302, com-
pletely drops the recommendation of the National Panel report
and the ACS-Lasker group for an independent cancer research
agency. The argument of biomedical researchers against the
altering of the structure and character of the NIH and the NCI
is accepted.
The report of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce on HR 11301 was issued on November 10, 1971. The
committee justifies the specific legislative appropriations
for cancer research which are included in HR 11302 as being
based on the National-Panel recommendations on this point. 108
The committee agrees with the National Panel recommendation
about the importance of a comprehensive national plan for can-
cer research.'09 The report also refers to the National Panel
recommendat.ions on administration and organizing, but inter-
prets the need for reorganization of cancer research as the
need for ",strengthening of the present organization of the
National Institutes of Health."1' 0 The comments of the National
Panel on administration which are referred to in this context
are very general ones: "The Cancer Panel emphasized the impor-
tance of effective administration of the cancer effort and
called for independence in management planning, budget presen-
tation, and assessment of progress--with clearly defined author-
ity and responsibility."1 i'
85
The committee report most clearly indicates its accept-
ance of the National Panel report in a section entitled "Panel
of Consultants' Recommendations and Provision of HR 11302,"
which totals ten pages.11 2 This section contains 22 detailed
recommendations of the National Panel referring to:
1. Administration of cancer research generally
2. The National Cancer Authority
3. The appointment of the director of the cancer
research program
4. Reports and budget presentation of the director to
the President and to the -Congress
5. Power of the NCA to enter into prime contracts
6. Power of the -NCA to utilize funds until expended
rather than only on an annual basis
7. The power of the NCA to make exceptions to present
regulations for the testing of experimental drugs
8. The power to produce on a large scale biological
materials needed for research
9. The power to support research by foreigners outside
the United States
10. The power to support any facilities necessary for
cancer research
11. The need to develop an overall program plan
12. The continuation of the activities of the NCI as the
transition is made to the new program
13. Full utilization of existing research facilities
14. The establishment of a network- of cancer centers
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15. The development of cancer control and prevention
programs
16. Support for manpower training programs
17. Increased emphasis on grants as opposed to contract
mechanisms of funding
18. The development of centralized banks of information
on cancer and cancer research
19. The need for participation of scientists in the plan-
ning of the cancer research program
20. Funding
21. The National Cancer Advisory Board
22. The need for a strong committment to the cancer
research program.
The House committee report comments on how specific pro-
visions of its bill fulfill these recommendations. Only five
recommendations from the above are not supported by the House
bill. These are:
1. The establishment of a National Cancer Authority
2. The Appointment of the Director of the NCA by the
President with the advice of the Senate (HR 11302
provides for the appointment of the NCI without the
approval of the Senate)
3. The power of the NCA to make exceptions to present
regulations for the testing of experimental drugs
(HR 11302 does not grant this power to the NCI)
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4. The participation of scientists in the planning of
the cancer research program (the c)mmittee report
refers to a project already underway in the NCI which
will accomplish this goal)
5. The establishment of a National Cancer Advisory Board
(HR 11302 preserves the presently existing National
Advisory Cancer Council). 
1 1 3
The debate in the House of Representatives on HR 11302
was distinctly lopsided in favor of HR 11302. No specific
quotations -of the recommendations of the National Panel were
made; however, the House debate involved similar lines of
argument and discussion as that contained in the subcommittee
hearings on cancer research and in the committee report refer-
red to above. Though the provisions of the bill were justi-
fied in terms of the same lines of argument as used by the
National Panel and the ACS ideology, except, of course, for
the provision ofs HR 11302 which establishes a National Cancer
Attack Program within the NIH and in coordination with the
NCI rather than the establishment of an independent cancer
research agency.
It should be noted that the bill which was produced by
the House and Senate conference committee on S 1828 and HR 11302
conforms more closely to the specific National Panel recommen-
dations than HR 11302. The final bill, the third version of
S 1828, includes the Senate provision for a National Cancer
Advisory Board, which is modified somewhat from the National
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Panel recommendation. The major difference between the
National Cancer Advisory Board and the National Advisory Can-
cer Council is that the Boards membership includes a much
larger number of laymen knowledgeable about cancer research
than the Council's. The laymen on the Board still constitute
a minority of the membership. The final bill also does not
include the provision of HR 11302 for the appointment of the
directors, in addition to the director of the NCI, of the
National Heart and Lung Institute and the National Institute
of Neurological Diseases and Stroke by the President. In
this way the other two institutes are not given the status
that is given to the NCI, which is in conformity to the feel-
ing of the ACS ideology that cancer research should be given
unique and highest research priority.
The philosophy and viewpoint of the final bill is expressed
in Section 2 of that bill. Cancer is viewed as a very serious
disease, the breakthrough theory is acknowledged, but the NIH
is defended (including a statement on the importance of all
biomedical sciences for cancer research):
The Congress finds and declares -
(1) that the incidence of cancer is increasing and cancer
is the disease which is the major health concern of
Americans today;
(2) that new scientific leads, if comprehensively and
energetically exploited, may significantly advance the
time when more adequate preventive and therapeutic
capabilities are available to cope with cancer;
(3) that cancer is a leading cause of death in the United
States;
(4) that the present state of our understanding of cancer
is a consequence of broad advances across the full scope
of biomedical sciences;
(5) that a great opportunity is offered as a result of
recent advances in the knowledge of this dread disease to
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(5) (continued) conduct energetically a national pro-
gram against cancer;
(6) that in order to provide for the most effective
attack on cancer it is important to use all of the bio-
medical resources of the National Institutes of Health;
and
(7) that the program of the research institutes which
comprise the National Institutes of Health have made it
possible to bring into being the most productive scien-
tific community centered u on health and disease that
the world has ever known. R4
In summary, the final legislation does not reflect the
concern of the ACS-Lasker group and cancer researchers as
expressed in the ideology with creating an agency separate from
the NIH, but reflects the arguments and concern of biomedical
researchers for maintaining the structure and interrelationships
among different fields of the NIH. The final legislation does
reflect the concerns of the ACS-Lasker group, cancer research-
ers, and the ACS ideology in the following ways: The concern
for a high priority for cancer research, the first element of
the ideology, is expressed by the provisions of the legislation
calling for appointment of the director of the NCI by the
President, and other mechanisms which insure that the President
and- the Congress have direct contact with the cancer research
program. The concern with rapid application of research results
to clinical treatment of patients is expressed by the provisions
establishing a national network of cancer research centers and
establishing cancer control programs. The second element of
the ideology, the breakthrough theory, is expressed in the
preamble to the legislation. The third element of the ideology,
the directed research element, is not explicitly expressed in
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the legislation, but is expressed in the provisions for the
establishment of cancer centers, giving broad authority to
the director, and for the more rapid and more flexible pro-
cedures for the review of applications for research grants.
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CONCLUSION
The ACS-Lasker lobbying group brought the issue of can-
cer research organization and of priorities for medical and
cancer reserach before Congress, and though other factors were
involved, the lobbying efforts of this group were very influ-
ential in the course of the debate and had a strong influence
on the final legislation produced. The cancer research ideology
expressed the beliefs and interests of the ACS-Lasker group,
most cancer researchers, most administrators of cancer hospi-
tals and research institutes with respect to the seriousness
of cancer research and the proper way to organize and direct
cancer research. The ideology provided a program for the
reorganization of cancer research; it provided also a justifi-
cation for increased funding and Federal support for cancer
research and justification for the specific program contained
in the ideology advanced by the report of the National Panel.
The final legislation reflected some of the attitudes and philo-
sophy of the ideology, and many of the specific items that were
called for in the reorganization of cancer research.
The health policy question which has already been implied
is: are there other interest groups who should have been
involved in the cancer research debate, and whose interests
were slighted by the way the issue was presented before Congress,
and the way the debate developed? The major interest groups who
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were involved were: the group who did articulate the cancer
research ideology, biomedical researchers and physicians who
opposed the dismantling of the NIH and the ACS ideology, and
President Nixon who had his personal interest in cancer
research, but also had his own political interests to look after.
The chief interest group which was left out are those poor and
low income people who are without adequate health care, both
in urban and rural areas. There is no really strong and well-
organized national organization, like the ACS and the ACS-Lasker
group whose purpose is the reordering of the nation's health
care priorities. The emotional appeal of a cancer crusade,
which is rightfully very great since cancer is a particularly
painful and serious disease, could only have been counteracted
by a strong presentation of the seriousness of inadequate health
care to some groups in our society. Such a presentation and
counter-argument to the ACS ideology would have probably involved
the development of a radical health care ideology. The presently
existing organizations and groups which are concerned with
health delivery, either the national health consumer organiza-
tion or the various "progressive" health professional organiza-
tions are not very strong, particularly on a national basis,
and certainly lack determined and politically savvy lobbyists
like Mary Lasker and the ACS lobbying group.
A strong national health care organization, with a well
articulated ideology, would not insure the delivery of adequate
health care to everyone, or reordering of research and medical
priorities, but would surely have some influence towards the
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direction of those goals. There are -several political reali-
ties to be taken into consideration. Probably the majority
of the people in this country would support increased research
priorities, since they do themselves receive adequate health
care, and since a very large part of the population is elderly
or middleaged, they are aware of their vulnerability to the
diseases of old age: cancer, heart disease, and stroke. The
concern with these diseases brings up several questions about
the implicit quest for immortality which underlies biomedical
research, and of the problem of a meaningful old age. Those
groups who are most concerned with the problem of health care
delivery are those who have been politically weak and disen-
franchised in the past, and still are weak: minority groups,
the poor, and low income groups.
The development of a strong national organization concerned
with the delivery of health care and a health care ideology,
both of which can be seen already arising in various forms
with various degrees of political radicalism, is a partial
solution- to the problem of the determination of health care
priorities. The effectiveness of a national organization or
organizations would depend on whether or not the present distri-
bution of power in the society is maintained or radically altered
towards previously disenfranchised groups. The determination
of health priorities is also still likely to be determined in
an atmosphere of opposing ideologies, emotional appeals, and
political considerations not very relevant to the particular
health issue.
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The implications for health policy are, needless to say,
pessimistic as they are for the field of health planning. For
health planning, regardless, of one's specific conception of
his role as a planner, as does any kind of planning, requires
a sufficient amount of financial support in order to insure
that adequate health care can be delivered. It remains to be
seen what specific health insurance plan will be devel.oped
by Congress, but it will probably be inadequate. Any kind of
planning also implies at least a partially rational sorting
out of goals and priorities. It certainly does not preclude
but demands the contesting of di.fferent value premises. This
thesis is a case study of the American political process and
ideological forces in that process, which can be speculatively
generalized to other cases of political decision-making in this
country, including those connected with planning.
Another problem for health planning is that of maintain-
ing coordination among different health problem areas. The
existence of national organizations and lobbying groups, with
their own powerful ideologies, often leads to the development
of categorical Federal progrmas for each problem area in
health supported by a different national organization. In can-
cer research, the full success of the ACS-Lasker lobbying effort
would have separated cancer research from the other areas of
biomedical research in the NIH; all areas of biomedical research
are related and it is doubtful whether sufficient research
coordination would have been maintained between the NIH and an
independent cancer research agency.
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The problem of categorical programs is accutely felt in
the coordination and planning of ambulatory health care deli-
very programs and facilities. There is little Federal money
available for the establishment of ambulatory comprehensive
health care facilities; the funding that was available has
been for OEO-sponsored comprehensive health centers, in con-
nection with the Model Cities programs, or for demonstration
or experimental projects like the Harvard Community Health Plan.
Very often newly established health care centers must search
for funding from a variety of categorical Federal programs,
such as the maternal and infant child care program, family
planning program (from which funding can sometimes be obtained
for gynecological services), and even the Regional Medical
Program. The establishment of new comprehensive health care
programs at this point in time is difficult; a program seeking
to provide comprehensive ambulatory health care for a community
or other defined group must depend on sporadic categorical fund-
ing, and planning for the expansion and development of the pro-
gram is extremely ad hoc.
This pessimistic conclusion should not be surprising to
those who have had experience in politics, and the solution
is to deal with the political realities as best one can, to
maintain what rationality is possible in planning, and at times
only to attempt to maintain some concept of planning in the
face of a political situation. As always the health planner
should pursue planning in accord with his own values and politi-
cal orientation and deal with the political realities, whether
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this be through "establishment"l-connected planning, client-
oriented planning, or advocacy planning. In addition one can
seek to strengthen presently disenfranchised and weak interest
groups. The development of a health care ideology would be
needed in the strengthening of weak groups, and, as shown by
the role of the ACS ideology in the cancer research debate,
would be helpful, if not necessary, in the defense of the
interests of these groups before Congress.
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Appendix A
METHODOLOGY
The sources of information for determining the positions
of various persons, organizations, and groups during the can-
cer research debate, and for determining the elements and par-
ticular expressions of the ACS ideology are five documents from
the House of Representatives and the Senate connected with the
cancer research issue--the House hearings on cancer research,
the Senate hearings on cancer research, the House committee
report on HR 11302, the Senate committee report on S 1828, and
the House and Senate conferees' report on S 1828; the report
of the National Panel of Consultants on the Conquest of Cancer;
and the most significant speeches and statements before the
Congress on the cancer research issue (including the debates
before the House and before the Senate). These references are
listed under "Sources of Information."
Information about the politics of cancer and the lobbying
efforts of the ACS-Lasker group was taken from several sources:
the articles by Bazell, Drew, Eisenberg, and Triolo which are
listed in the bibliography, and the article, "Big Debate: How
to Organize 'Conquest of Cancer'" listed in the bibliography.
Some additional information came from the sources of informa-
tion connected with the Congress.
The research approach consisted of reading through the
sources of information listed above and taking notes on most
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statements and references to the ACS ideology in the documents,
less extensive notes on statements about the seriousness of
cancer (whether or not they were articulated by proponents of
the ACS ideology or stated in connection with elements of the
ideology), and less extensive notes on arguments and statements
which are opposed to the ACS ideology. A certain amount of
selectivity was used in taking notes on the ACS ideology;
statements which articulated an element or expression of the
ideology on which extensive notes had already been taken were
not specifically noted unless they were particularly interest-
ing or were particularly articulate expressions of the ideology.
Using this precedure, extensive notes were taken on the
Senate hearings, the first 400 (out of 800) pages of the House
hearings, the House committee report on HR 11301, the Senate
committee report on S 1828, the report of the National Panel,
the statements before Congress of Senators Yarborough and Jackson
on cancer research in 1970, and the statements of President Nixon
on cancer research organization in 1971 (which were included in
the hearings on cancer research). Cursory notes were taken on
the second half of the House hearings and the actual debates in
Congress about cancer research organization; the arguments and
statements made in these sources were very much repetitive of
the arguments and statements made in the other sources which
have been noted. Notes were entered on filecards, which were
classified according to the following outline: .
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I. The Concensus in Support of Cancer Research.
A. The seriousness of cancer.
1. Cancer is a serious disease.
a. Data supporting this position.
b. Nonemotional statements that cancer is a serious
disease.
c, Very strong or emotional statements about cancer.
2. Cancer research should be a national priority.
3. The aim of the research is to eradicate cancer.
B. The cancer problem as a challenge to scientific ability.
1. Nonspecific reference.
2. Specific references to comparisons to the moonshot
program and atomic homb project; without reference
to the National Cancer Authority, i.e., references
not connected with the ACS position explicitly.
C. Cancer research and the advancement of scientific know-
ledge.
D. Cancer research and the extension of the human lifespan
(especially the implicit hopes for immortality).
E. Patriotic references, anti-Communism.
II. The ACS Ideology
A. Breakthrough theories of cancer research
1. Specific expectations for the elimination of cancer
within a specific time period.
2. Expectations for the reduction of cancer mortality
within a specific time period.
3. Expectations for very great advances in the treatment
of cancer.
4. References to the "oncogene" theory of Robert Huebner.
B. Directed research.
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II. C. Reorganization of cancer research.
1. Issues of the administration and organization of
cancer research: direct involvement of the
President, etc.
2. Establishment of. the National Cancer Authority.
a. Nonspecific references to the NCA.
b. Comparisons between the NCA and the AEC, the
Manhattan project, the atomic bomb project,
NASA, and the moonshot program.
3. Establishment of the Cancer Conquest Agency (or
National Cancer Agency) under the NIH.
III. Statements Opposed to the ACS Position.
A. Statements opposed to the Breakthrough theory.
1. Statements opposed to the elimination of cancer in
a certain time period.
2. Statements opposed to expectations for the reduction
of cancer mortality in a given period of time.
3. Statements opposed to any optimistic predictions
about great advances in cancer research.
4. Statements disputing the theories of Robert Huebner.
B. Arguments and statements opposed to the ACS ideology's
approach to research; i.e., statements opposed to
directed research.
C. Statements opposed to ACS ideology's recommendations for
the reorganization of cancer research.
1. Statements opposed to the ACS ideology's specific
recommendations and approach to the organization of
cancer research.
2. Statements which defend the structure and quality of
research work of the NIH and the NCI.
D. Support for more research support to heart disease and
stroke research, and opposed to more research support
for cancer research alone.
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The above outline was developed after a preliminary reading
of some of the sources of information and was written as above
except for minor modifications made in the course of the research.
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Appendix B
SOURCES OF INFORMATION
A. House of Representatives. Reports and Hearings:
1. National Cancer Act of 1971, Hearings before the Sub-
committee of Public Health and the Environment of the
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on HR 8343,
HR 10681, and S 1828, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1971
2. National Cancer Attack Act of 1971, Report of the Com-
mittee on Interstate.and Foreign Commerce to Accompany
HR 11302, House Report 92-659, Washington, D.C., U.S.
G.P.O., 1971
3. National Cancer Act of 1971, Conference Report, House
Report 92-722; identical to the conference report to
the Senate, Senate Report 92-565
B. Senate Reports and Hearings:
1. National Program for the Conquest of Cancer, Report of
the National Panel of Consultants on the Conquest of
Cancer, Washington, D.C., U.S. G.P.O., 1971
2. Conquest of Cancer Act, 1971, Hearings before the Sub-
committee on Health of the Senate Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare on S 34 and S 1828, Washington, D.C.,
U.S. G.P.O., 1971
3. Conquest of Cancer Act, Report to Accompany S 1828,
Senate Report 92-247, Washington, D.C., U.S. G.P.O.,
1971
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C. In the Congressional Record:
1. Statements by Senators Yarborough an,' Jackson, March 25,
1970; U.S.A. Congressional Record, Vol. 116, Part 7,
pp. 9260-9262
2. Statements by Senator Yarborough, December 4, 1970;
Vol. 116, #194, pp. S 19424- S 19427
3. Statements by Senator Nelson, May 21, 1971; Vol. 117,
#76, pp. S 7560- S 7564
4. Debate in the Senate on S 1828, July 7, 1971; Vol. 117,
#104, pp. S 10598- S 10634
5. Statements by Senator Nelson, October 15, 1971; Vol. 117,
#154, pp. S 16347- S 16348
6. Debate in the House of Representatives on HR 11302,
November 15, 1971; Vol. 117, #174, pp. H 11010- H 11029
Other:
1. Statements of members of the National Panel of Consult-
ants. on the Conquest of Cancer before a Senate luncheon,
February 11, 1971, reprinted in full pp. 279-284 in
National Cancer Act of 1971, Hearings before the Subcom-
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on HR 8343,
HR 10681, and S 1828
2. President Nixon's statement at the introduction of S 1828
to the Senate, May 11, 1971, reprinted in full, pp. 306-
308 in Conquest of Cancer Act, 1971, Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Health of the Senate Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare on S 34 and S 1828
D.
